Two-period duopolies with forward markets

How to cite

Cox, Caleb; Pelster, Matthias; Karam, Arze. 2019. "Two-period duopolies with forward markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003940. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3940-4.0

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Caleb Cox* , Matthias Pelster , Arze Karam

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003940
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3940-4.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-10-30 – 2015-11-27
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Durham)
JEL codes
D21, D22, D43, D53
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3940

Abstract

We experimentally consider a dynamic multi-period framework of a Cournot duopoly with a simultaneous option to engage in financial risk management and a real option to delay supply. The option to engage in financial risk management allows players to manage risk before uncertainty is realized, while the real option allows them to manage risk after uncertainty is realized. Due to the real option, our multi-period setting is not a mere repetition of a single-shot interaction. In such a setting, firms face a strategic dilemma: they must weigh the advantages of dealing with their risk exposure against the disadvantages of higher competition. In theory, firms consider the strategic impact of the hedging component, which enhances market competition. Our experimental results provide supportive evidence of this theory by suggesting that the hedging device significantly increases competition and negates duopoly profits even in a simultaneous setting.

Experimental design

There are two experimental conditions: Single Production and Double Production.

The Single Production condition is divided into three periods. In the initial period, each player make a production and hedging decision. In the second period, a demand state is realized, and each player observes the decisions of the other player and second-period profits. Players then make sales and hedging decisions. In the third period, another demand state is realized, and each player observes the decisions of the other player and third-period profits

The Double Production condition is similar to the Single Production condition, except that players make an additional production decision in the second period.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization to experimental conditions is done in office by computer.
Randomization unit
Groups of participants (sessions) are randomized to experimental conditions.
Clusters
8
Observations
100 subjects
Arms
Single Production: 52 subjects Double Production: 48 subjects
Primary outcomes
production, hedging, and sales decisions

Papers from this trial

  1. Working paper https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VTTiVbX9YyKH1uhLiq39nKwfenl0tYb1/view?usp=sharing
  2. Experiment Instructions https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FH5KbBWqoSap5EDW04g7aCZagcIaVQr-/view?usp=sharing

Cited by

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Keywords