Cooperation culture and monetary incentives to cooperate: An experiment in a company

How to cite

Deversi, Marvin; Spantig, Lisa. 2019. "Cooperation culture and monetary incentives to cooperate: An experiment in a company." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003931. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3931-3.0

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Marvin Deversi* , Lisa Spantig

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003931
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3931-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-02-06 – 2019-02-21
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
C72, D83, C91, H41, M52
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3931

Abstract

Cooperation among employees is one of the most important pillars for company success. A common practice to foster a cooperative culture among employees is to provide monetary incentives to cooperate. For example, through managers or institutional arrangements that allocate monetary rewards to more cooperative employees. However, economic theory as well as empirical evidence suggest that such incentive choices can induce unintended side effects. In the economic literature on cooperation it has been emphasized that incentive choices can signal bad (or good) news about the prevalence of uncooperative individuals in a population. As a consequence, incentives can have limited or even counterproductive effects on cooperative behavior. Do incentive choices work as information devices in a natural environment, namely, in a company that wants to foster cooperation? And what are the implications for the company’s efforts? The pre-analysis plan that I upload here outlines hypotheses and planned analyses of a fully-incentivized online experiment with about 50 managers and 350-400 employees from a large company. It focuses on the information effects induced by managers’ incentive choices on the cooperation culture among employees measured in an online public good game experiment.

Intervention

In 2017, the company has participated in a first study (as outlined by Deversi et al., 2019, AEARCTR-0002596) to measure and subsequently foster their culture of cooperation. Importantly, the managers and all subordinate employees have not been informed about the study results yet. In the planned online experiment, I randomly inform managers about the results and randomly state to employees that the manager has been informed. In the planned experiment, managers choose incentives of a public good game played by non-managing employees.

Experimental design

I use a between subject design for managers and non-managing employees.

Treated managers get informed about the cooperation behavior of employees in the first study. Managers in the control group do not receive any information on this.

I state to the non-managing employees in the treatment group that managers have been informed when choosing incentives of the game to be played. There is no statement about this in the control group‘s instructions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by the company's survey team in their office using a computer.
Randomization unit
Work teams.
Clusters
No clusters planned for analysis. Approx. 120 teams selected.
Observations
About 50 managers and 350-400 non-managing employees.
Arms
About 185 per treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
The main variables of interest are the belief about others’ contributions and the descriptive norm.
Secondary outcomes
Other variables of interest are the unconditional contributions, injunctive norms, and cooperative attitudes. I use the employees’ beliefs about the managers’ choice behavior, expectations, and prescriptive views as robustness variables.

Papers from this trial

  1. Deversi & Spantig (2023): "Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company", CESifo Working Paper 10302 https://www.ifo.de/en/cesifo/publications/2023/working-paper/incentive-and-signaling-effects-bonus-payments-experiment-company

Cited by

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Keywords