Do workers discriminate against their out-group employers? Evidence from an online labor market

How to cite

Asad, Sher Afghan; Bhattacharya, Joydeep; Banerjee, Ritwik. 2019. "Do workers discriminate against their out-group employers? Evidence from an online labor market." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003885. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3885-3.1

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Sher Afghan Asad* , Joydeep Bhattacharya , Ritwik Banerjee

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003885
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3885-3.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2019-04-01 – 2019-12-31
Countries
United States of America (All the states)
JEL codes
J7, C9, D9
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3885

Abstract

A large body of literature in economics has demonstrated that prejudice or bias of the majority group towards members of an out-group identity – whether it be racial, religious, ethnic or gender in origin – is widespread in labor markets. Such biases often lead to discrimination. It is commonly believed that labor market discrimination is one-sided: driven by employers toward their out-group employees. In this research, we restrict attention to racial identity and seek to study possible discrimination in the reverse direction, i.e., we ask, do workers discriminate on the intensive margin (say, by shirking or under-providing effort) for an out-group employer relative to an otherwise-identical, own-group one? We design a large scale real effort experiment on Amazon's Mechanical Turk to answer our research question.

Experimental design

In this experiment, each worker will be randomly assigned to one of the following ten treatments and will then work on a simple button pressing task, alternating `a' and `b' button presses on the keyboard, to score `points'. Workers' payment scheme and the matched employers will vary depending on the assigned treatment. Here is a list of treatments.
1. Piece Rate – 0 cents: A worker’s payment will be unaffected by the number of points he/she scores in the task. No matched employer.
2. Piece Rate – 3 cents: A worker will be paid 3 cents for every 100 points he/she scores in the task. No matched employer
3. Piece Rate – 6 cents: A worker will be paid 6 cents for every 100 points he/she scores in the task. No matched employer
4. Piece Rate – 9 cents: A worker will be paid 9 cents for every 100 points he/she scores in the task. No matched employer
5. Altruism Baseline: A worker’s payment will be unaffected by the number of points he/she scores in the task. Worker’s matched employer will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points scored by the worker. The employer identity will be hidden.
6. Altruism Black: Earning rule will be the same as in the Altruism Baseline for both the worker and the employer. The employer’s forearm and hand will reveal dark/white skin color in the video. The employer will be Black.
7. Altruism White: Earning rule will be the same as in the Altruism Baseline for both the worker and the employer. The employer’s forearm and hand will reveal dark/white skin color in the video. The employer will be White.
8. Reciprocity Baseline: A worker’s payment is unaffected by the number of points he scores in the task. The worker will be paid 20 cents extra as a reward before the task begins. Worker’s matched employer will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points scored by the worker. The employer identity will be hidden.
9. Reciprocity Black: Earning rule will be the same as in the Reciprocity Baseline for both the worker and the employer. The employer will be Black.
10. Reciprocity White: Earning rule will be the same as in the Reciprocity Baseline for both the worker and the employer. The employer will be White.

Design details

Randomization method
Done by Qualtrics' randomization feature as the worker joins the study. The subjects will be assigned to treatments based on the blocked randomized design where a block is defined by the combination of gender, age, income, education, party and the most lived' state of the respondent. Each white subject will be assigned to one of the ten treatments, while the black subjects will be assigned to one of the only four treatments (race salient treatments).
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
6,000 white individuals and 2,400 black individuals The study will be kept open on Amazon Mechanical Turk until either 3 weeks have passed or 6,000 white subjects have completed the study, whichever comes first. If three weeks pass without 6,000 white subjects completing the study, then the study will be kept open (up to six weeks) until 6,000 subjects are obtained. The study may be left open for black workers for a longer duration, just because there are not enough black workers on MTurk and it may be harder to get a representative number of black workers in that time frame.
Observations
6,000 white individuals + 2,400 black individuals
Arms
600 individuals per treatment
Primary outcomes
Each worker in this experiment will work on a simple button-pressing task, alternating `a' and `b' on the keyboard, to score 'points'. A number of points scored by each worker (effort) on the given task in a given treatment will be the primary outcome of interest.
Secondary outcomes
Beliefs on demographics of the racial groups Black and White.
Sponsors
Name: College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Iowa State University Location: Ames, IA Url: https://las.iastate.edu/ Name: Russell Sage Foundation Location: 112 E 64th St, New York, NY 10065 Url: https://www.russellsage.org/ Name: Economics Department, Iowa State University Location: Ames, IA Url: https://www.econ.iastate.edu/

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Keywords