Do workers discriminate against their out-group employers? Evidence from an online labor market
How to cite
Asad, Sher Afghan; Bhattacharya, Joydeep; Banerjee, Ritwik. 2019. "Do workers discriminate against their out-group employers? Evidence from an online labor market." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003885. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3885-3.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
A large body of literature in economics has demonstrated that prejudice or bias of the majority group towards members of an out-group identity – whether it be racial, religious, ethnic or gender in origin – is widespread in labor markets. Such biases often lead to discrimination. It is commonly believed that labor market discrimination is one-sided: driven by employers toward their out-group employees. In this research, we restrict attention to racial identity and seek to study possible discrimination in the reverse direction, i.e., we ask, do workers discriminate on the intensive margin (say, by shirking or under-providing effort) for an out-group employer relative to an otherwise-identical, own-group one? We design a large scale real effort experiment on Amazon's Mechanical Turk to answer our research question.
Experimental design
In this experiment, each worker will be randomly assigned to one of the following ten treatments and will then work on a simple button pressing task, alternating `a' and `b' button presses on the keyboard, to score `points'. Workers' payment scheme and the matched employers will vary depending on the assigned treatment. Here is a list of treatments.
1. Piece Rate – 0 cents: A worker’s payment will be unaffected by the number of points he/she scores in the task. No matched employer.
2. Piece Rate – 3 cents: A worker will be paid 3 cents for every 100 points he/she scores in the task. No matched employer
3. Piece Rate – 6 cents: A worker will be paid 6 cents for every 100 points he/she scores in the task. No matched employer
4. Piece Rate – 9 cents: A worker will be paid 9 cents for every 100 points he/she scores in the task. No matched employer
5. Altruism Baseline: A worker’s payment will be unaffected by the number of points he/she scores in the task. Worker’s matched employer will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points scored by the worker. The employer identity will be hidden.
6. Altruism Black: Earning rule will be the same as in the Altruism Baseline for both the worker and the employer. The employer’s forearm and hand will reveal dark/white skin color in the video. The employer will be Black.
7. Altruism White: Earning rule will be the same as in the Altruism Baseline for both the worker and the employer. The employer’s forearm and hand will reveal dark/white skin color in the video. The employer will be White.
8. Reciprocity Baseline: A worker’s payment is unaffected by the number of points he scores in the task. The worker will be paid 20 cents extra as a reward before the task begins. Worker’s matched employer will be paid 1 cent for every 100 points scored by the worker. The employer identity will be hidden.
9. Reciprocity Black: Earning rule will be the same as in the Reciprocity Baseline for both the worker and the employer. The employer will be Black.
10. Reciprocity White: Earning rule will be the same as in the Reciprocity Baseline for both the worker and the employer. The employer will be White.
Design details
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