Gender Differences in Multilateral Bargaining

How to cite

Kovaliukaite, Ada; Baranski-Madrigal, Andrzej; Geraldes, Diogo; Tremewan, James. 2019. "Gender Differences in Multilateral Bargaining." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003881. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3881-1.0

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Ada Kovaliukaite* , Andrzej Baranski-Madrigal , Diogo Geraldes , James Tremewan

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003881
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3881-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Withdrawn
Trial dates
2019-02-18 – 2019-02-21
Countries
Netherlands (Maastricht)
JEL codes
C7, C9, D7
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3881

Abstract

Many economic and political settings involve multilateral bargaining scenarios. Potential gender differences in these scenarios may shed light on the gender gap in labor market outcomes as well as political representation. In a laboratory experiment, we exogenously manipulate the gender composition of the group to test, whether gender differences do appear in a simple three player bargaining game. We study an unstructured bargaining protocol under a majority voting rule to understand, who initiates the bargaining process and what coalitions are formed to arrive at an agreement. We measure the efficiency and equality of the bargaining outcomes to evaluate group and individual performance across treatments.

Intervention

In a laboratory experiment, we exogenously manipulate the gender composition of the group in a between subjects design to test, whether gender differences appear in a simple three player bargaining game, when the information about the gender composition of the group is revealed to the subjects. The experiment entails 4 treatments: all female, all male, female majority and male majority groups. A control group could be considered the all male treatment with an interest of changes in outcomes as more females are added to the game.

Experimental design

3 symmetric agents make costless proposals in an unstructured setting to bargain over a decaying surplus. Allocations are confirmed through a majority voting rule. Interactions are repeated for 12 rounds with random rematching. At the end of the experiment, subjects complete a survey module to provide responses for the exploratory analysis of the main experimental data.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in the lab by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individuals are randomly assigned to matching groups of 12 subjects within 24 subject sessions. They play 12 rounds of a bargaining game with random rematching within their matching group. Each treatment consists of 6 matching groups.
Clusters
24 matching groups.
Observations
288 participants.
Arms
6 matching groups (72 subjects) per treatment.
Primary outcomes
We will observe the effects of the gender composition of the group on the following outcomes: endogenously arising characteristics of the proposer, proportion of formed minimal winning coalitions, gender composition of the resulting coalitions, efficiency and equality of bargaining outcomes, as well as individual performance.
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes are obtained from the survey module responses at the end of the experiment. We will collect data on individual risk aversion, time discounting, trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity (Falk et al, 2018), as well as competitiveness (Reuben et al), and scores in the cognitive reflection test. We will also observe subject responses to the questions about the purpose of the experiment and salience of the information about the gender composition of the group.

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Keywords