The Political Economy of University Tuition: Representative Experiments on How Information and Design Affect Public Preferences for Tuition
How to cite
Lergetporer, Philipp; Woessmann, Ludger. 2019. "The Political Economy of University Tuition: Representative Experiments on How Information and Design Affect Public Preferences for Tuition." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003873. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3873-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Public preferences for charging tuition are crucial for determining higher education finance. To test whether public support for tuition depends on available information and design features, we devise several survey experiments in representative samples of the German electorate (N>19,500). The electorate is divided, with a slight plurality against charging tuition. Providing information on the university earnings premium raises support for tuition by 7 percentage points. The opposition-reducing effect persists two weeks after treatment. Information on fiscal costs and unequal access does not affect public preferences. Designing tuition as deferred income-contingent payments raises support by 16 percentage points, creating a strong majority favoring tuition. The same effect emerges when framed as loan payments. Support for tuition decreases with higher levels and increases when targeted at non-EU students.
Intervention
We investigate how information provision about economic aspects of the higher edu-cation system and design aspects of the tuition payment scheme affect public preferences for tuition. The first set of experiments focuses on randomized information provision about (i) the earnings differential between persons with and without a uni-versity degree, (ii) public cost per university student, and (iii) unequal access to uni-versity education by parental education. The second set of experiments investigates the effects of the following design features on public preferences for university tuition: (i) deferred, income contingent payments; (ii) level of tuition; (iii) tuition targeted towards non-EU citizens. In all experiments, we randomized respondents between a control group who stated preferences for regular tuition without information provision and specification of design features, and different treatment groups.
Experimental design
We implement our experiments in five waves of the ifo Education Survey (2014 to 2018), an annual opinion survey on education policy that we conducted in Germany. Each wave was carried out between April and July of the respective year and covered a nationally representative sample of the German voting-age population (18 years and older). In addition, in the 2018 wave, we sampled adolescents aged between 14 and 17 years. Polling and randomization was carried out by the polling firm KANTAR Public. Within each survey wave, we randomized respondents into different treat-ment arms as follows:
Wave 2014:
Control group: N=1,032
Treatment group 1 (“Earnings information”): N=1,030
Treatment group 2 (“Cost Information”): N=1,056
Treatment group 3 (“Access information”): N=1,053
Wave 2015:
Control group: N=1,390
Treatment group 1 (“Earnings information”): N=1,355
Treatment group 2 (“Income contingency”): N=1,360
Wave 2016:
Control group: N=781
Treatment group 1 (“Income contingency”): N=852
Treatment group 2 (“Level 500”): N=804
Treatment group 3 (“Level 1500”): N=865
Wave 2017:
Control group: N=2,075
Treatment group 1 (“Earnings information”): N=2,003
(Part of the respondents were also re-surveyed two weeks after main experiment to investigate treatment-effect persistence).
Wave 2018:
Control group: N=1,036
Treatment group 1 (“Income contingency”): N=1,005
Treatment group 2 (“Student loans”): N=970
Treatment group 3 (“Non-EU students”): N=1,035
(In addition to adult respondents, we sampled 1,085 adolescents and randomized them between control group (N=525) and treatment “Income contingency” (N=560)).
Description of treatments:
“Earnings information”: Information about earnings differential between persons with and without a university degree provided directly before eliciting preferences for university tuition.
“Cost information”: Information about overall public cost per university student pro-vided directly before eliciting preferences for university tuition.
“Access information”: Information about unequal access to university education by parental education provided directly before eliciting preferences for university tui-tion.
“Income contingency”: Tuition specified as income-contingent tuition that is due after graduation and has to be paid only if income exceeds a certain threshold.
“Level 500”: Tuition level specified at 500 Euros per semester.
“Level 1500”: Tuition level specified at 1500 Euros per semester.
“Student loans”: Treatment “Income contingency” framed as student loans.
“Non-EU students”: Tuition specified to be targeted towards non-EU students.
Importantly, we report treatment effects for all survey participants in the representative adult samples, and the adolescent sample who have non-missing stated preferences for tuition. Sample sizes were pre-specified with our polling firm. Thus, we do not engage in selective reporting of results on parts of our sample.
Design details
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