Pay-for-performance, Motivation and final output in the health sector in DRC
How to cite
Huillery, Elise; Seban, Juliette. 2014. "Pay-for-performance, Motivation and final output in the health sector in DRC." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000386. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.386-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The experiment studies the effects of a financing mechanism for the health sector in which governmental payment to health facilities is contingent upon the number of patients for some pre-determined health services, as opposed to a fixed payment. Even though performance-based financing models have been implemented in developed and developing countries in various settings and forms, the scientific evidence on its impact on health worker effort and consequent health outcomes remains thin. From 2009 to 2013, a research project was conducted in the Haut-Katanga district of DRC to study the effect of the PBF approach compared to a fixed payment approach. The 96 health areas present in the Haut-Katanga district were randomly assigned to performance-based or fixed payments, while ensuring that the same amount of governmental resources was allocated to each group to neutralize the ressource effect. The two mechanisms have been in place from June 2010 to September 2012. Administrative data was collected throughout the project, spotchecks of health workers' attendance were performed in July, August and September 2012, and a final independent survey was administered from December 2012 to Feburary 2013 -after the incentives have been withdrawn. We give evidence that pay-for-performance led to more effort from health workers with respect to rewarded services. Equally important, health workers did not substitute effort put in non-rewarded activities. However, the increase in overall staff motivation happened at the expense of its intrinsic component. Finally, the increased effort put in by the health workers proved unsuccessful at attracting more patients, suggesting that health workers lacked means or inventiveness to meet their objective. There are key policy implications of our findings for governments considering PBF as a way to allocate public ressources to the health sector. First, pay-for-performance increases health worker overall motivation without deterring service quality or non-rewarded services, meaning that health workers are strategic but not cynical; However, two types of precaution should be considered. First, contingent rewards reduce the intrinsic component of health worker motivation so incentives should be used as a permanent instrument otherwise it would backfire. Second, our results suggest that contingent rewards are not appropriate when the task is difficult and requires sophisticated strategies, because agents focus on the reward and do not develop novel ideas to reach complicated goals. The translation of motivation into performance may thus be better in contexts where the rewarded task is easy.
Intervention
In Haut-Katanga district, the 96 health areas (totalizing 152 health facilities and a catchment population close to two millions) were randomly assigned to one of two payment systems.
- In the fixed payment group, the amount allocated to each facility was calculated based on the staff in the facility: a list of eligible workers was established at the beginning of the pilot conjointly by Ministry of Health; each worker received a given payment depending on his/her grade and experience.
- In contrast, payments to the PBF health facilities were to be made after verification of declared service volumes by facilities. The targeted services included seven services at the primary care level (outpatient first curative consultations, prenatal consultations, deliveries, obstetric referral, children completely vaccinated, tetanus toxoid vaccination, and family planning consultations) and three additional services at the secondary care level (C-section, blood transfusion, and obstetric referrals to hospitals).
In order to ensure neutrality in the level of financing between the two groups and isolate the incentive effect from the resource effect, the total budget allocated to health facilities in the PBF group was the same as the total budget allocated to health facilities in the fixed payment group. The relative prices attached to the targeted services were constant, but absolute prices and facility payments were determined by the quantity of services provided by the facility relative to the quantity of services provided by the other incentivized health facilities in order to keep the total enveloppe constant. The budget used in this experiment estimated at $0.43 per capita per year.
Service volumes were measured by use of monthly reports submitted by facilities, in which the number of patients for each targeted service was reported. Subsequently verification of declared service volumes was conducted by verification agents through (i) comparing reported volumes with those found in health facility registers, and (ii) verifying that the information noted in the registers was true by conducting community verification: a random sample of 30 patients in registers were selected and visited by independent associations to check the accuracy of the information reported in the facility register. Community verifications were meant to take place only in the PBF group as part of the financing mechanism. However, we conducted community verifications in the fixed payment health facilities for impact evaluation purposes (1 community verification by facility in the comparison group). The fixed payment health facilities had no incentive to cheat on service volumes so the comparison of discrepancy rates between the PBF and the fixed payment groups allow for differentiating cheating from natural -unavoidable- discrepancies due to the fact that some patients moved or were absent at the time of the verification. A system of financial sanctions was integrated in order to reduce providers’ incentives to submit fraudulent reports and over-reporting of phantom patients.
Experimental design
96 health areas were randomly assigned to one of two payment systems.
Design details
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