The Poor Tax: Effects of Redistributive Pressures in Côte d’Ivoire
How to cite
Grosset-Touba, Florian; Carranza, Eliana; Donald, Aletheia; Kaur, Supreet. 2019. "The Poor Tax: Effects of Redistributive Pressures in Côte d’Ivoire." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003821. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3821-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In developing countries, financial transfers within social and kin networks are ubiquitous and frequent (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006). This project asks whether the potential welfare benefits of such transfers come at an important efficiency cost. We conceptualize redistributive arrangements as a tax on earnings. We design an intervention with piece-rate factory workers that makes it easier to convert earnings increases into long-run savings that can be retained by workers using an illiquid savings instrument. We examine how this intervention affects labor supply, earnings, and output. We augment this with additional tests to rule out confounds, such as self-control problems.
Intervention
We offer a private, blocked savings account to regular piece-rate factory workers. These are employed full-time in formal cashew-processing factories in Côte d’Ivoire. Production is an individual manual activity (e.g., peeling cashews). Each worker receives an individual piece rate for her output—so that changes in effort translate directly into changes in worker's earnings and factory output.
In Phase 1, eligible workers randomly selected into treatment will be offered a private commitment savings account. This account pays out deposited savings in a lump sum after 9 months(at a private date). During the blocked period, deposits cannot be accessed—making it possible to save, while credibly denying transfer requests. Once the blocked period ends, workers can use the saved funds or leave them in the bank account.
This account can only be used for above-average baseline earnings, allowing workers flexibility to cover household needs and emergencies. Treatment workers will be offered the option to choose a threshold, equal to or greater than the worker’s historical average fortnightly earnings, above which any additional salary they earn fortnightly will be automatically and privately deposited into a savings account. We compare the daily attendance and productivity of control vs. treatment workers (“productivity effect”).
After the completion of Phase 1, a subset of workers will be offered a private illiquid account (similar to the one available in Phase 1). A second subset will instead be offered an account that may be used by the bank for promotional purposes and advertised to their social network. We test whether the labor supply and productivity effects observed in Phase 1 change depending on whether workers are offered a private or public account.
Experimental design
The design will be implemented in two phases. In a first phase, we individually randomize eligible factory workers. Eligibility is based on attendance and seniority at the plant. In a second phase, we experimentally vary the visibility of the accounts.
Design details
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