The Poor Tax: Effects of Redistributive Pressures in Côte d’Ivoire

How to cite

Grosset-Touba, Florian; Carranza, Eliana; Donald, Aletheia; Kaur, Supreet. 2019. "The Poor Tax: Effects of Redistributive Pressures in Côte d’Ivoire." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003821. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3821-1.0

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Florian Grosset-Touba* , Eliana Carranza , Aletheia Donald , Supreet Kaur

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003821
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3821-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2016-09-19 – 2019-12-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3821

Abstract

In developing countries, financial transfers within social and kin networks are ubiquitous and frequent (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006). This project asks whether the potential welfare benefits of such transfers come at an important efficiency cost. We conceptualize redistributive arrangements as a tax on earnings. We design an intervention with piece-rate factory workers that makes it easier to convert earnings increases into long-run savings that can be retained by workers using an illiquid savings instrument. We examine how this intervention affects labor supply, earnings, and output. We augment this with additional tests to rule out confounds, such as self-control problems.

Intervention

We offer a private, blocked savings account to regular piece-rate factory workers. These are employed full-time in formal cashew-processing factories in Côte d’Ivoire. Production is an individual manual activity (e.g., peeling cashews). Each worker receives an individual piece rate for her output—so that changes in effort translate directly into changes in worker's earnings and factory output.

In Phase 1, eligible workers randomly selected into treatment will be offered a private commitment savings account. This account pays out deposited savings in a lump sum after 9 months(at a private date). During the blocked period, deposits cannot be accessed—making it possible to save, while credibly denying transfer requests. Once the blocked period ends, workers can use the saved funds or leave them in the bank account.

This account can only be used for above-average baseline earnings, allowing workers flexibility to cover household needs and emergencies. Treatment workers will be offered the option to choose a threshold, equal to or greater than the worker’s historical average fortnightly earnings, above which any additional salary they earn fortnightly will be automatically and privately deposited into a savings account. We compare the daily attendance and productivity of control vs. treatment workers (“productivity effect”).

After the completion of Phase 1, a subset of workers will be offered a private illiquid account (similar to the one available in Phase 1). A second subset will instead be offered an account that may be used by the bank for promotional purposes and advertised to their social network. We test whether the labor supply and productivity effects observed in Phase 1 change depending on whether workers are offered a private or public account.

Experimental design

The design will be implemented in two phases. In a first phase, we individually randomize eligible factory workers. Eligibility is based on attendance and seniority at the plant. In a second phase, we experimentally vary the visibility of the accounts.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done in the office by one of the PIs or Research Assistants on the computer, prior to the start of each phase. Workers selected into treatment are invited to join sensitization sessions, led by one of the PIs or Research Assistants (including translators hired by the research team) during which they learn about the treatment and their treatment assignment.
Randomization unit
Workers are randomized into different treatment waves at the individual level.
Clusters
The productivity of at least 200 individuals will be measured across two factories. We will enroll all eligible workers across the two factories. Thus, the final sample size will be determined by total employment numbers at the factories at that time.
Observations
Over 75,600 productivity observations (200 workers * 6 workdays/week * (50 weeks of intervention + 13 weeks pre-intervention))
Arms
The shares of the sample in the different treatment arms will be approximately as follows: (1) Phase 1: 50% Treatment, 50% Control (2) Phase 2: Among those who receive blocked accounts, approximately 50% will receive public blocked accounts, and 50% will receive private blocked accounts.
Primary outcomes
Our key outcome variables relate to the labor supply of workers. Specifically, we will look at the effect of the intervention on productivity (measured by daily output and earnings) and attendance. We will also consider quits.
Secondary outcomes
To complement those key outcomes, we collect baseline data on perceptions about redistribution and its relationship to savings and the returns to effort. In addition, we will attempt to collect data on the level of transfers to members of the workers' kin network and the effects on overall savings, intra-household decision-making power and subjective well-being among workers. Finally, we will correlate revealed preference measures of self-control problems with treatment effects.

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Keywords