Correspondence Bias and Memory
How to cite
Liu, Yiming; Loewenstein, George; Han, Yi. 2019. "Correspondence Bias and Memory." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003819. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3819-1.4000000000000001
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project aims to understand correspondence bias and its determinants, especially its interactions with imperfect memory. Correspondence bias is the tendency to draw inferences about a person's enduring characteristics from behaviors that can be entirely explained by the incentives/environment that induce them. In our first study, we identify the bias through a clean experimental design that deals with three potential confounders. Subjects in our experiment play a dictator game as the dictator in the first stage. In stage 2, they are randomly matched into a group of 4 to play a benign game and a malign game. Benign game promotes cooperation, while the malign game motivates them to harm each other. In stage 3, we elicit their benign premium, which is their willingness to pay, as the receiver in the dictator game, to choose the one they play the benign game with as their dictator. Furthermore, our design enables us to investigate whether there are ways to potentially alleviate correspondence bias or even eliminate it. The second study concerns the interactions between imperfect memory and correspondence bias. The central hypothesis is actions are easier to recall than the environment in which actions take place. Consequently, correspondence bias becomes more severe when people have to rely on their long-term memory to make a decision as it becomes even harder to attribute behaviors to the environment instead of a person's enduring characteristics. We test this hypothesis by comparing benign premium, our measure for correspondence bias, when there is no delay between obtaining information in stage 2 and making partner choice in stage 3 and when there is a 1-hour delay between the two.
Experimental design
We have two treatments in our experiment. The first one is the instant choice condition. This treatment has four major stages. At the first stage, all subjects make a decision as the dictator in the dictator game. At the second stage, they are randomly matched into groups of four to play the benign game and the malign game. The benign game encourages cooperation, while the malign game motivate subjects to harm each other. At the end of the second stage, subjects are able to see their outcomes in the benign game and the malign game and their partners' choices. Third, they are asked, as the receiver, to choose a dictator between a benign game partner and a malign game partner to play the first stage dictator game. We predict that there exists a benign premium: subjects are willing to pay to be matched with the benign game partner. Lastly, they are asked to recall the key information generated in the experiment: who they play with, which game they play, the payoff they get and what actions their partners choose.
The second treatment is the delayed choice condition. The setup of this treatment is the same with the instant choice condition with one exception: there is a 1-hour delay at the end of the second stage. After looking at the results of the benign game and the malign game, we ask subjects to take a break for 1 hour before they can proceed to stage 3. During that hour they are free to choose any activity they want. After the 1-hour delay ends, they have 10 minutes to log back into the study and finish stage 3. If they come back more than 10 minutes late, then they can only get half of their experimental payment excluding the show-up fee.
The central assumption is people can recall the actions of others but not the environment in which those actions are taken. In the delayed choice condition, subjects take a 1 hour break between stage 2 and stage 3. So to utilize the information generated in stage 2 when making the stage 3 decision, subjects need to reply more on their memory in the delayed choice condition. The hypothesis is the benign premium, our measure for correspondence bias, is larger in the delayed choice condition than in the instant choice condition. As we also ask subjects to recall the game they play and others' actions in stage 2, we can directly test whether the 1-hour delay indeed affects people's recall of previous events or not.
To deal with the potential selection issue, we also add a 1-hour delay in the instant choice condition. After subjects finish the recall questions, they enter a 1-hour waiting period. The rule of the delay is the same with the delayed choice condition. After the delay ends, they can see their payoffs. In both the instant and delayed decision condition, we inform the subjects in the recruiting advertisement that the experiment will last around 1 hour and 20 minutes but the actual decision time is around 20 minutes. Subjects are required to have at least 90 minutes of free time at the time of signing up in both conditions.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.