The Elasticity of Tax Compliance: Evidence from Randomized Property Tax Rates
How to cite
Bergeron, Augustin; Weigel, Jonathan; Tourek, Gabriel. 2019. "The Elasticity of Tax Compliance: Evidence from Randomized Property Tax Rates." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003818. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3818-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
How does tax compliance vary with the size of the tax burden when opportunities for evasion are high? This paper estimates the elasticity of property tax compliance in a field experiment in Kananga, the Democratic Republic of Congo, a setting where the status quo level of compliance is low. In collaboration with the provincial government, we randomly assign four fixed tax rates at the household level as part of a door-to-door city-wide tax collection campaign. Individuals face between 50 and 100% of their true liability. We study how compliance and total government revenues vary with the rate. We also examine the effects of randomized rates on bribe payment and contributions to informal taxes (in-kind labor payments). Our findings will contribute to knowledge about the determinants of tax compliance in weak states as well as the design of optimal liabilities and enforcement in such settings.
Intervention
In collaboration with the provincial government, we randomly vary the tax rate faced by periphery and midrange property owners between 50 percent and 100 percent of the full property tax rate. For periphery properties, the property tax rate experimentally varies between 1,500 Congolese Francs (CF) and 3,000 CF, in increments of 500 CF. For midrange properties, the property tax rate experimentally varies between 6,600 CF and 13,200 CF, in increments of 2,200 CF. Citizens are not informed that they may be receiving discounts: they are simply randomly assigned the rate on the tax bill without mention of the full rate.
In addition, we randomize the 'bonuses' received by tax collectors for collecting taxes:
1. Half of the houses in the periphery category are assigned a fixed 750 CF bonus.
2. Half of the houses in the periphery category are assigned to a bonus equal to 30% of the tax rate corresponding to that household.
Holding the bonus constant—at a fixed amount or proportional share of the tax amount— will permit us to control for tax collector incentives across rates
Experimental design
The unit of randomization is the property. There are approximately 46,000 properties in total in Kananga according to data from the 2016 property tax campaign described in Weigel (2018).
We employ a block-randomized design, stratifying on neighborhood, each of which was identified on a satellite map with boundaries like roads, ravines, or other natural features that would be easily identifiable from the ground. There are 364 neighborhoods in total in Kananga. We excluded the 8 neighborhoods that were part of the logistics pilot mentioned above.
Design details
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