The Elasticity of Tax Compliance: Evidence from Randomized Property Tax Rates

How to cite

Bergeron, Augustin; Weigel, Jonathan; Tourek, Gabriel. 2019. "The Elasticity of Tax Compliance: Evidence from Randomized Property Tax Rates." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003818. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3818-2.0

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Augustin Bergeron* , Jonathan Weigel , Gabriel Tourek

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003818
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3818-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2018-06-15 – 2019-04-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
H2, H3, D73
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3818

Abstract

How does tax compliance vary with the size of the tax burden when opportunities for evasion are high? This paper estimates the elasticity of property tax compliance in a field experiment in Kananga, the Democratic Republic of Congo, a setting where the status quo level of compliance is low. In collaboration with the provincial government, we randomly assign four fixed tax rates at the household level as part of a door-to-door city-wide tax collection campaign. Individuals face between 50 and 100% of their true liability. We study how compliance and total government revenues vary with the rate. We also examine the effects of randomized rates on bribe payment and contributions to informal taxes (in-kind labor payments). Our findings will contribute to knowledge about the determinants of tax compliance in weak states as well as the design of optimal liabilities and enforcement in such settings.

Intervention

In collaboration with the provincial government, we randomly vary the tax rate faced by periphery and midrange property owners between 50 percent and 100 percent of the full property tax rate. For periphery properties, the property tax rate experimentally varies between 1,500 Congolese Francs (CF) and 3,000 CF, in increments of 500 CF. For midrange properties, the property tax rate experimentally varies between 6,600 CF and 13,200 CF, in increments of 2,200 CF. Citizens are not informed that they may be receiving discounts: they are simply randomly assigned the rate on the tax bill without mention of the full rate.

In addition, we randomize the 'bonuses' received by tax collectors for collecting taxes:
1. Half of the houses in the periphery category are assigned a fixed 750 CF bonus.
2. Half of the houses in the periphery category are assigned to a bonus equal to 30% of the tax rate corresponding to that household.
Holding the bonus constant—at a fixed amount or proportional share of the tax amount— will permit us to control for tax collector incentives across rates

Experimental design

The unit of randomization is the property. There are approximately 46,000 properties in total in Kananga according to data from the 2016 property tax campaign described in Weigel (2018).

We employ a block-randomized design, stratifying on neighborhood, each of which was identified on a satellite map with boundaries like roads, ravines, or other natural features that would be easily identifiable from the ground. There are 364 neighborhoods in total in Kananga. We excluded the 8 neighborhoods that were part of the logistics pilot mentioned above.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization was done by a computer.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is the property / property owner.
Clusters
356 neighborhoods (polygons defined on a satellite map of the city of Kananga using boundaries like roads, ravines, or other natural features that would be easily identifiable from the ground)
Observations
For our primary outcome tax payment we will use administrative data to evaluate the effect of the various treatment arms on compliance. For this analysis, we have the universe of compounds in Kananga, approximately 46,000 according to data from Weigel (2018). For other outcomes, we will rely on a midline survey conducted with all the property owners in the sample (N=46,000) and on an endline survey with a sample size at least as large as our baseline sample (N=4,343).
Arms
50 Percent of the Full Tax Rate : 11,500 (10,350 periphery properties, 1150 midrange properties) 66 Percent of the Full Tax Rate: 11,500 (10,350 periphery properties, 1150 midrange properties) 88 Percent of the Full Tax Rate: 11,500 (10,350 periphery properties, 1150 midrange properties) 100 Percent of the Full Tax Rate: 11,500 (10,350 periphery properties, 1150 midrange properties)
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome is tax compliance (i.e., whether citizens pay the property tax).
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes include 1) bribe payment to tax collectors, 2) households' contributions to informal taxes, 3) citizens' views of the local government, 4) measures of spending and consumption.

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Keywords