Elicitation of preferences and beliefs in light of new information: a laboratory experiment
How to cite
Proto, Eugenio; Melkonyan, Tigran; Sofianos, Andis. 2019. "Elicitation of preferences and beliefs in light of new information: a laboratory experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003815. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3815-2.3000000000000003
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Bayesian Updating is the dominant theory of learning in economics and other disciplines. According to this theory, decision-makers have prior beliefs which they update according to Bayes rule after receiving new information. The theory is silent about how individuals react to receiving information that the subjects have not observed previously and, hence, which they may deem impossible. Recent theoretical literature has put forth a possible mechanism, called “reverse Bayesianism”, which decision-makers may use to react to unforeseen events. However, these and other possible mechanisms have not been experimentally tested. The project will fill this large gap in the literature by running a series of economic experiments.
A summary description of our design follows. First, a randomly chosen subject will be asked to repeatedly draw balls from an urn in front of all other subjects in each experimental session. This will allow subjects to form beliefs about the proportion of different prizes in the urn. Subsequently, subjects’ beliefs about the composition of the urn and their willingness to accept for lotteries rewarding them according to draws out of urn are elicited. At this point, a new urn with several balls representing one new prize is presented and the subject responsible to make draws is asked to draw from the new urn. Subsequently, the contents of the new urn are poured into the old one (with the explicit note that the new urn does not contain any previously observed prizes) and subjects are told that they will be paid according to the draws from the resulting combined urn. Finally, we elicit subjects’ willingness to accept for a lottery rewarding them according to a draw out of the urn again (based on observations of drawings from the old urn and the subsequent draw from the combined urn) as well as their perceived likelihoods of each prize.
We have two "surprise" treatments and two control treatments. In the "good surprise" treatment the new prize will be higher than the one observed in the "bad surprise" treatment. In the control treatments, we reveal ex-ante the urn compositions.
This design will allow us to explore how adding an unexpected prize changes subjects’ beliefs about the composition of the urn. We will in particular address the following questions. Do individuals naturally expect events that were previously considered impossible? Do individuals learn to expect what is previously considered impossible? How individuals update their beliefs about the urn composition after an unexpected event takes place? Do individuals attach a positive or negative value to the consequences of such events?
Experimental design
We design an experiment where subjects are asked to report subjective probabilities of prizes and the certainty equivalent values of lotteries determined by drawing prizes from a real urn, from which they observe several realisations prior to making their decisions. These elicitations are incentivised by using methods similar to Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) to report the subjective probability of prizes and their willingness to accept to sell the lotteries (see the enclosed documents for more details).
There are two main treatments for the main part of the design:
A) In the control treatments:
1) Subjects in the laboratory observe 20 draws from a real urn containing 24 balls with prize B=80 TOKENS and 36 balls with prize C=190 TOKENS. This urn is called the “original urn” and they are told that this urn contains two and only two possible prizes . They need to report their subjective probabilities of the two prizes and their willingness to accept for selling the lottery determined by a random draw from the urn.
2) We bring the new urn, draw one prize and say on PC Screen: "This urn contains only this prize. Please click OK to confirm you understand this". In the bad control, the new prizes are 15 balls labelled with 15 tokens, while in good control there are 15 balls labelled with 375 tokens. Now we drop the contents of the original urn into the new urn which together form the updated urn. Subjects need to report their subjective probabilities of the three prizes and their willingness to accept for selling the lottery determined by a random draw from the updated urn.
B) In the surprise treatments:
1) In the surprise treatment: Subjects observe 20 draws from a urn -- that we call "original urn". The urn contains 24 balls with prize B=80 TOKENS and 36 balls with prize C=190 TOKENS. They are asked to report their subjective probabilities of the two prizes and their willingness to accept for selling the lottery determined by a random draw from the original urn.
2) At this point we bring the new urn, draw one prize and say on PC Screen: "This urn contains new prizes. One such prize is the one you see. The urn contains no prizes similar to what you have been observing as a result of random draws from the other urn. Please click OK to confirm you understand this." In bad surprise the new prizes are 15 balls labelled with 15 tokens, while in good surprise there are 15 balls labelled with 375 tokens. Now we drop the contents of the original urn into the new urn which together form the updated urn. Subjects are asked again to report their subjective probabilities of the three prizes and their willingness to accept for selling the lottery determined by a random draw from the modified urn.
After the main part is completed we elicit the level of risk aversion using Eckel and Grossman method.
Each session ends with a short (non-incentivized) Raven test and some general demographic questions.
Design details
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