Information Provision on Tax Benefits for Charitable Giving
How to cite
Teirlinck, Marrit. 2019. "Information Provision on Tax Benefits for Charitable Giving." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003658. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3658-6.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Most governments of developed countries offer some form of tax benefits to encourage charitable giving. The efficacy of such policies eventually depends on whether donors are attentive towards these policies and what (mis)perception donors have. A rich tax literature has demonstrated that consumers are inattentive to value-added taxes when they are not salient and that individuals have misperceptions concerning complex tax incentives. There is little evidence whether salience and information provision of tax deductions might matter for donations. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the results from previous studies in the tax literature that test for salience and information provision would translate to charitable giving, since making extrinsic incentives more salient could potentially crowd out intrinsic motivation. Whether more salient tax incentives and information provision could induce donors to give more is therefore an empirical question. This research project aims to answer this question by conducting an online field experiment on Germany's largest online platform for charitable giving. The intervention will take place on the payment page of the platform, where potential donors decide how much they wish to donate, after which they should fill in the required fields and complete the payment for the donation. For each website visitor, I exogenously vary whether information is provided on tax benefits.
Intervention
In the treatment group the potential donor is will receive information on tax benefits for donations in Germany. The intervention is implemented on the payment page of the platform and the information will be provided at the moment when the donor is deciding for the amount to donate. The control group will see the regular payment page as it is currently set up on the platform without any information on tax deductions for donations.
Experimental design
The intervention will take place on the payment page of the platform, where the potential donors decides for their final donation amount, completes the required fields and completes the payment for the donation. For each website visitor, I exogenously vary the
information that is displayed on tax deductions.
Treatment 1: Control Group. Visitors that are assigned to the control group will see the regular payment page as it is currently set up on the platform, without any information on tax deductions for donations.
Treatment 2: Information Provision on Tax Savings. In the treatment group the potential donor is will receive information on tax benefits for donations in Germany. An approximated tax savings amount is displayed, which is based on the average earner in Germany, and is dependent on the donation amount the donor picks. Additionally the donor can select a different income bracket in a drop down menu to obtain an more precise approximation according to his or her income bracket.
Design details
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