Motivated Motive Selection
How to cite
Veldhuizen, Roel van; Stüber, Robert; Barrron, Kai. 2018. "Motivated Motive Selection." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003617. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3617-1.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Lying costs and social preferences are perhaps the two most well-documented deviations from selfish maximization behavior in the economic literature. We hypothesize that in situations where both these motives are present and are in conflict, individuals may in a self-serving way put more weight on the motive that helps them maximize their earnings. We test this hypothesis using a laboratory experiment that allows us to document whether such motivated motive selection is present.
Experimental design
We use a laboratory experiment that shares a common basic structure with both the classic dictator game and the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) lying game. In part 1 of the experiment, participants take on the role of the dictator and report a number that determines their payment and the payment of the recipient. In part 2 of the experiment, participants take on the role of a third-party dictator. In part 3, we elicit the social appropriateness of different choices in part 2 in an incentive-compatible way.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Barron, Kai and Stüber, Robert and Veldhuizen, Roel van, Moral Motive Selection in the Lying-Dictator Game (2022). CESifo Working Paper No. 9911, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4215030 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4215030 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4215030
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