Social Information in Sequential Dictator Games - A Replication Study
How to cite
ashraf, sruthi; Eckel, Catherine; Je, Hyundam; Vitaku, Valon; Sinha, Nishita. 2018. "Social Information in Sequential Dictator Games - A Replication Study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003607. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3607-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This study is a replication of a previous study published in 1998. It is a dictator game conducted in 2 rounds. For the dictator game, people are paired and are provided some amount of money to divide among themselves. The dictator determines the allocation. In this experiment, the researchers wish to see the change in dictator allocations, if any, when social information is provided. The information of dictator allocation in the first round being the treatment social information (S1) for the second round.
In this experiment, the subjects are put into groups of 4. For each round, the dictator allocation is 40 tokens (USD 20). Dictator chooses P for herself and 40-P goes to the other non-dictator subject. A higher P implies more self-regarding behavior. All subjects choose P1 and fill out their choice forms. Irrelevant information acts as baseline control here which is the birthday of participant (S2). Experimenter facilitates information exchange on P1 or birthday. All subjects then choose P2. Bingo cage decides which sub-group (even or odd) is sellers/buyers and the order S1 and S2.
The hypotheses tested are, the Zero Social Influence Hypothesis - (Second Price Choice – First Price Choice) between Relevant and Irrelevant treatment groups is not different, differential Social Influence Hypothesis – absence of social payoff and dramatic Social Influence Hypothesis – difference between first choice and information received.
Experimental design
Our experimental design includes two main treatments. In both treatments, subjects first chose an initial dictator allocation with no information other than the instructions. The Irrelevant Information treatment serves as a baseline control, in which subjects receive socially irrelevant information between their two dictator decisions. In the Relevant Information treatment, each subject learns the first dictator allocation chosen by one other subject. Each subject then specifies a single second dictator allocation to another subject who is different from the subject affected by his initial dictator allocation. In the Irrelevant Information treatment, each subject in the group receives information on another subject's birth date ranging between 0 to 31 and makes the second choice thereafter.
Design details
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