Social Information in Sequential Dictator Games - A Replication Study

How to cite

ashraf, sruthi; Eckel, Catherine; Je, Hyundam; Vitaku, Valon; Sinha, Nishita. 2018. "Social Information in Sequential Dictator Games - A Replication Study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003607. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3607-2.0

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sruthi ashraf* , Catherine Eckel , Hyundam Je , Valon Vitaku , Nishita Sinha

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003607
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3607-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2018-11-05 – 2018-12-05
Countries
United States of America (Texas)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3607

Abstract

This study is a replication of a previous study published in 1998. It is a dictator game conducted in 2 rounds. For the dictator game, people are paired and are provided some amount of money to divide among themselves. The dictator determines the allocation. In this experiment, the researchers wish to see the change in dictator allocations, if any, when social information is provided. The information of dictator allocation in the first round being the treatment social information (S1) for the second round.
In this experiment, the subjects are put into groups of 4. For each round, the dictator allocation is 40 tokens (USD 20). Dictator chooses P for herself and 40-P goes to the other non-dictator subject. A higher P implies more self-regarding behavior. All subjects choose P1 and fill out their choice forms. Irrelevant information acts as baseline control here which is the birthday of participant (S2). Experimenter facilitates information exchange on P1 or birthday. All subjects then choose P2. Bingo cage decides which sub-group (even or odd) is sellers/buyers and the order S1 and S2.
The hypotheses tested are, the Zero Social Influence Hypothesis - (Second Price Choice – First Price Choice) between Relevant and Irrelevant treatment groups is not different, differential Social Influence Hypothesis – absence of social payoff and dramatic Social Influence Hypothesis – difference between first choice and information received.

Experimental design

Our experimental design includes two main treatments. In both treatments, subjects first chose an initial dictator allocation with no information other than the instructions. The Irrelevant Information treatment serves as a baseline control, in which subjects receive socially irrelevant information between their two dictator decisions. In the Relevant Information treatment, each subject learns the first dictator allocation chosen by one other subject. Each subject then specifies a single second dictator allocation to another subject who is different from the subject affected by his initial dictator allocation. In the Irrelevant Information treatment, each subject in the group receives information on another subject's birth date ranging between 0 to 31 and makes the second choice thereafter.

Design details

Randomization method
The subjects are allocated an index card randomly when they enter the lab. Then are allocated to groups of four randomly based on the number on the balls drawn using a bingo cage. The buyer and seller are decided based on bingo ball draws.
Randomization unit
There will be groups of 4 for both treatment and control group. The subjects are assigned to groups randomly using bingo balls and bingo cage.
Clusters
12 groups of 4
Observations
48
Arms
6 groups for treatment and 6 for control
Primary outcomes
Information of previous round dictator allocation affects the current dictator allocation.

Cited by

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Keywords