Apologies in Public Goods Game

How to cite

ZHUO, SHI; Yeo, Jonathan. 2018. "Apologies in Public Goods Game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003567. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3567-2.1

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SHI ZHUO* , Jonathan Yeo

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003567
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3567-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2018-11-01 – 2020-11-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3567

Abstract

The project aims to examine the effect of apologies on coordination and cooperation, the underlying mechanism and its efficiency, in a public
goods experimental game.

Experimental design

An experimental lab setting will be used for the research. At the beginning of the session, each participant will be randomly assigned to 1 of the 3 treatments: control, public apologies, private apologies. Participants will be randomly assigned to groups of 4 and play a standard repeated public goods game for 16 periods. In the treatment groups, participants will be able to send apology messages to group members after contributions revealed. We also plan to conduct three extra treatments with regrouping in each period to further explore the mechanism.

Design details

Randomization method
All randomizations are done via the python-based otree computer program.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
312 to 432 participants
Observations
312 to 432 participants
Arms
52 to 72 control (13 to 18 groups), 52 to 72 public apologies (13 to 18 groups), 52 to 72 private apologies (13 to 18 groups), 52 to 72 control with regrouping (13 to 18 groups), 52 to 72 public apologies with regrouping (13 to 18 groups), 52-72 private apologies with regrouping(13 to 18 groups) For regrouping treatments, we might do 24 to 40 for both private and public apologies instead, or just do one of the two apologies, depending on the available funding.
Primary outcomes
Average group contribution in treatment groups compared to control groups; Dynamics of individual apologies and contribution in treatment and control groups; Dynamics of individual estimation of other group members' contribution and evaluation of other group members' altruism in treatment and control groups
Secondary outcomes
Individual characteristics and correlation with primary outcomes; Individual contribution preference in one-shot public goods games and correlation with primary outcomes

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Keywords