Wholesale Price Discrimination in Global Sourcing:Field Experiment on Alibaba
How to cite
Li, Meng; Yu, Lili; Li, Jingyun; Cui, Ruomeng. 2018. "Wholesale Price Discrimination in Global Sourcing:Field Experiment on Alibaba." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003557. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3557-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Past research has found price discrimination in B2C markets, where buyers are end customers. There is limited study on suppliers’ price quoting behavior and price discrimination on B2B markets. It is unclear whether characteristics of B2B buyers, who are often representatives of firms and not the end customers,would influence suppliers’ pricing decisions. In this research, we investigate whether there exists wholesale price discrimination, by conducting randomized field experiments on Alibaba.com, the world largest online global trade platform. We find that there is no significant difference in the wholesale prices quoted by suppliers to U.S. and South Africa buyers. We also find that suppliers quote a significantly higher wholesale price to White buyers than Asian or Black buyers across countries. However, price discrimination disappears when buyers present market information to sellers—providing the lowest wholesale price offered by other suppliers in the market, whereas price discrimination remains when buyers present social information to sellers—indicating the buyer is recommended by a previous customer. In addition, we find that market information can help buyers obtain a lower wholesale price because it signals a lower willingness to pay.Social information, however, can reduce price quotes for only Black and White buyers as it fosters trust, but not for Asian (particularly Chinese) buyers possibly due to the distrust between Chinese sellers and buyers.
Intervention
Buyers sent messages to sellers between July 29, 2018 and August 30, 2018. Each message asks the seller to provide the price quote for 1000 units of the pre-selected product. The message content varies under different information conditions. In the “No information”condition, i.e., the control group, the buyer includes the most basic information in the inquiry message. In the “Market information” condition, the buyer reveals his expected price. The price can signal that the buyer is aware of the prevailing market price. In the message, after introducing himself,the buyer provides the market information “We have searched for the market price, and for this model the lowest price is USD [a specific dollar value]” prior to requesting the price quote. In the “Social information” condition, the buyer provides social information “Your company was recommended to us by a peer.” In the “Both information” condition, the buyer provides both market and social information in their inquiries.
Experimental design
Our paper aims to study sellers' wholesale price discrimination over buyers' origin and race and whether market and social information can mitigate the discrimination. We therefore design and conduct a three-way---Country*Race*Information---field experiment on Alibaba.
Design details
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