Decentralization and Local Public Goods: How does allocation of decision-­making authority affect provision?

How to cite

Madajewicz, Malgosia; Habib, Ahasan; Tompsett, Anna. 2018. "Decentralization and Local Public Goods: How does allocation of decision-­making authority affect provision?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003555. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3555-2.0

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Malgosia Madajewicz* , Ahasan Habib , Anna Tompsett

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003555
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3555-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2007-01-01 – 2011-11-30
Countries
Bangladesh (Gopalganj and Matlab upazilas)
JEL codes
D02, H41, O12, O17, O20
Secondary IDs
National Science Foundation Grant 0624256
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3555

Abstract

The purpose of the study is to determine conditions under which participation by the community in the provision of the social services which the community needs improves access to those services. Access to services such as sanitation, health care and education remains inadequate for much of the world's population, including disadvantaged communities in the United States. No consensus exists about how to improve access to services. Many policy-makers, like the World Bank, have embraced the view that access to services would improve if users of services participated in providing those services, and more generally that local participation is necessary to improve the performance of all development projects. The hypothesis that users of services have more information about their needs and a greater interest in a good outcome than does a remote central organization is reasonable. However, local control can also lead to control by a few powerful people for their own benefit, a community may lack technical knowledge and may be unable to exploit economies of scale. In this study, we implement three organizational interventions designed to provide access to safe drinking water in Bangladesh. In each type of intervention, the authority to make decisions regarding the provision of safe water will be allocated differently to test the hypothesis that community participation improves outcomes.

Intervention

We implement the following interventions. The collaborating NGO offers sources of safe drinking water in villages and contributes to the cost of the safe water in the form of a loan. One intervention is based on the traditional model, in which the collaborating NGO makes all decisions about the source of safe water and how it will be provided. Another intervention will represent the opposite extreme on the spectrum of community participation. The NGO will ask the village residents to make all decisions. The third intervention is an intermediate one, in which the NGO restricts the way in which the village residents participate in the provision of safe water. Discussions with NGOs and case studies suggest testing an intervention which strives to achieve broad participation across socio­economic groups in planning and execution and requires public disclosure to the village of every decision made and identity of its supporters.

A control group of villages will receive no intervention at all. Importantly, we will not be withholding assistance from villages. Currently, funding is not available to offer assistance to all villages affected by the arsenic problem. We will extend such assistance immediately if funding becomes available.

Experimental design

The original study design was to: i) randomly select 250 villages from eligible villages in the study area (those in which a large percentage of wells is contaminated with arsenic, the main threat to safe water in the study area, and which have not yet received an intervention to provide safe water,); ii) randomly select one hundred of these villages to receive no intervention; iii) implement the three interventions in fifty villages each, randomly selected among the villages not assigned to control.

Design details

Randomization method
Office
Randomization unit
Village
Clusters
250 villages
Observations
10,000 households (40 in each village)
Arms
100 control villages; 50 villages in each of the three treatment arms
Primary outcomes
Whether the household is using safe drinking water; the household's costs of accessing drinking water; whether the household participated in the planning and implementation of the new source of water or will participate in its management.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Madajewicz, M., Tompsett, A., & Habib, M. A. (2021). How does delegating decisions to communities affect the provision and use of a public service? Evidence from a field experiment in Bangladesh. Journal of Development Economics, 150, 102609. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102609

Cited by

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Keywords