The Hidden Advantage of Promises: Pareto Improvements in a Gift-Exchange Game
How to cite
Zhang, Peilu; Palma, Marco A.. 2018. "The Hidden Advantage of Promises: Pareto Improvements in a Gift-Exchange Game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003533. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3533-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this paper, we conduct a lab experiment to test the effects of using non-binding promises to boost efficiency in contract design. By allowing the employee to decide whether to make a non-binding “claim and promise” or not before the employer chooses the wage level in a gift exchange game, we add more (sequential) interactions between the employee and employer in the procedure of transaction. We ask if these interactions can bring a Pareto improvement to the gift-exchange game? We will also use real effort in two of our treatments to see if the main results hold when employees must provide real effort. We will also use eye-tracking and facial expressions to explore the hidden guilt and emotions when employees break promises and review the wage levels set by employers.
Intervention
The interventions include "claim and promise" and "real effort".
Experimental design
In this experiment, we have one baseline and three treatments. The baseline is the basic gift-exchange game. The three treatments are "claim and promise", "real effort-baseline", "real effort-claim and promise"
Design details
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