Strategic Behavior, Learning and Technology Adoption

How to cite

Lerva, Benedetta. 2018. "Strategic Behavior, Learning and Technology Adoption." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003521. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3521-3.0

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Benedetta Lerva*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003521
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3521-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2018-09-24 – 2019-12-31
Countries
Uganda (Eastern)
JEL codes
O13, O33, Q12, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3521

Abstract

The opportunity to free-ride on other individuals' learning costs can delay technology adoption or lead to sub-optimal adoption rates.
I study learning about a pest-control technology among small-holding farmers in Uganda. In this context, delayed adoption may enable a large scale infestation with sizeable economic effects.
I identify two types of free-riding in my setting, namely free-riding on information and free-riding on action.I attempt at separating the two by exploiting experimental variation induced by information interventions.

Experimental design

I elicit farmers' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a training session of 3 hours with an agricultural extension worker, focused on the maize pest Fall Armyworm. The recipient of the training may be the farmer herself or another sampled farmer in her village. Therefore, I elicit as many prices from each farmer as the number of sampled farmers in her village including herself. Prices are elicited through a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and range from 0 to 40,000 Ugandan Shilings (UGX) in increments of 2,000. Each farmer is assigned a single random price for the training, and a farmer can purchase the training only if her stated WTP is at least as large as the random price.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is performed through a personal computer running Stata software. Training prices are preassigned and stratified by the treatment assignment of a previous RCT that the author is conducting on the same sample. The name of the farmer(s) that the respondent is going to either meet or be informed about plot distance are also selected at random and all equally likely.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit for both training price assignment and information treatment is the individual.
Clusters
799 farmers express their willingness-to-pay to train each other sampled farmer in the village. This yields a total of 5498 prices elicited, which is my unit of observation.
Observations
799 farmers express their willingness-to-pay to train each other sampled farmer in the village. This yields a total of 5498 prices elicited, which is my unit of observation.
Arms
1345 meeting treatment, 1374 distance information treatment, 2779 control
Primary outcomes
Willingness-to-Pay for an agricultural training to be received by the farmer herself or another farmer residing in the same village as the respondent.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. erva,Benedetta. The Monetary Value of Externalities : Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Farmers (English). Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 10521 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099712107242326460/IDU02568a9e1082c204e130b62009be4b672006f

Cited by

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Keywords