Voting or abstaining in "managed" elections? An RCT in Bangladesh

How to cite

Islam, Asad; Hodler, Roland. 2018. "Voting or abstaining in "managed" elections? An RCT in Bangladesh." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003509. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3509-1.1

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Asad Islam* , Roland Hodler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003509
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3509-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2018-12-03 – 2019-10-30
Countries
Bangladesh ()
JEL codes
C93, D72.
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3509

Abstract

In many recent elections across the globe, the incumbent government has taken actions prior to or on election day to make its defeat very unlikely. We call such elections "managed" (or authoritarian) elections. We aim to understand the determinants of whether and how people vote in managed elections. In such elections, citizens who oppose the incumbent government have mainly two options: They can vote for an opposition candidate to signal their policy preferences to the regime; or they can abstain from voting to reduce the regime's post-election legitimacy. Our research questions are how the salience of these two options affect whether and how people vote in managed elections; and how this effect differs between areas in which the party of the current incumbent prime minister enjoyed strong support in the past and areas in which it did not. We study these questions in the general elections in Bangladesh that are scheduled for December 30, 2018. Given the current political climate, Bangladesh offers an ideal setting for studying voting behavior in managed elections.

Intervention

There are two types of treatments. The first is the message that voting outcomes may affect policy-making (T-policy). The second is the message that high turnout may increase the political legitimacy of the government (T-legit).

Experimental design

We choose 150 villages that supported the party of the current incumbent government in past elections and 150 villages that supported the main opposition party. From within these two blocks of villages, we randomly choose 50 villages that receive treatment T-policy, 50 villages that receive treatment T-legit, and 50 control villages. We then randomly select 35-40 individuals per village, with roughly equal gender balance.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Village/polling station
Clusters
300 villages
Observations
around 11,000 households/individuals
Arms
150 villages that supported AL in past elections and 150 villages that supported BNP. We randomly divide both groups of 150 villages into 50 villages that receive treatment T-policy, 50 villages that receive treatment T-legit, and 50 control villages.
Primary outcomes
Individual voting participation coded based on the observation of an ink mark on the finger. Official polling station-level data on turnout and the incumbent vote share. Survey information about the voting participation of other voters within the respondents' family.
Secondary outcomes
Changes between pre-treatment and post-vote surveys in the respondents' view on the value of democracy and their opinion about the role of members of parliament.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Ahmed F., Hodler R., Islam A., 2024. Partisan effects of information campaigns in competitive authoritarian elections: Evidence from Bangladesh. Economic Journal, forthcoming https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead115

Cited by

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Keywords