Voting or abstaining in "managed" elections? An RCT in Bangladesh
How to cite
Islam, Asad; Hodler, Roland. 2018. "Voting or abstaining in "managed" elections? An RCT in Bangladesh." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003509. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3509-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In many recent elections across the globe, the incumbent government has taken actions prior to or on election day to make its defeat very unlikely. We call such elections "managed" (or authoritarian) elections. We aim to understand the determinants of whether and how people vote in managed elections. In such elections, citizens who oppose the incumbent government have mainly two options: They can vote for an opposition candidate to signal their policy preferences to the regime; or they can abstain from voting to reduce the regime's post-election legitimacy. Our research questions are how the salience of these two options affect whether and how people vote in managed elections; and how this effect differs between areas in which the party of the current incumbent prime minister enjoyed strong support in the past and areas in which it did not. We study these questions in the general elections in Bangladesh that are scheduled for December 30, 2018. Given the current political climate, Bangladesh offers an ideal setting for studying voting behavior in managed elections.
Intervention
There are two types of treatments. The first is the message that voting outcomes may affect policy-making (T-policy). The second is the message that high turnout may increase the political legitimacy of the government (T-legit).
Experimental design
We choose 150 villages that supported the party of the current incumbent government in past elections and 150 villages that supported the main opposition party. From within these two blocks of villages, we randomly choose 50 villages that receive treatment T-policy, 50 villages that receive treatment T-legit, and 50 control villages. We then randomly select 35-40 individuals per village, with roughly equal gender balance.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Ahmed F., Hodler R., Islam A., 2024. Partisan effects of information campaigns in competitive authoritarian elections: Evidence from Bangladesh. Economic Journal, forthcoming https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead115
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