Decomposing coordination failure in stag hunt games

How to cite

Kendall, Ryan. 2018. "Decomposing coordination failure in stag hunt games." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003435. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3435-3.0

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Ryan Kendall*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003435
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3435-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2018-10-25 – 2019-06-10
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C72, C92, D81
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3435

Abstract

Humans are generally motivated to make choices that earn high payoffs with a low level of risk. This trade-off can be stylized as the Stag Hunt coordination game where there exists both a payoff-dominant equilibrium and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Previous models have been provided which aim to predict when humans will coordinate on either equilibrium. Here I use a new approach to show a general disconnection between these models' predictions and actual human decision making. Furthermore, I create games for a laboratory experiment which test whether or not these models predict human behaviour well in this setting.

Intervention

There are many ways to define a 2x2 Stag Hunt game using different payoff components. This laboratory experiment studies how subjects make different choices in Stag Hunt game with different payoff components.

Experimental design

The experiment design follows the protocol associated with experimental economics. More particularly, my experiment design follows as closely as possible the design of previous papers investigating this phenomena. The novelty of my approach is entirely in the payoff-construction of the games.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is carried out by the computer.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
Following from the previous literature, I plan to have 8 sessions each with 8 subjects for each of my 4 treatments. This leads to a total of 256 subjects.
Observations
Each of the 256 subjects will make 75 choices. So there will be a total number of 19,200 choices observed.
Arms
There will be 8 Game 1 sessions, 8 Game 2 sessions, 8 Game 3 sessions, and 8 Game 4 sessions.
Primary outcomes
First, I aim to show a disconnection between our current models and human behaviour. Second, using these findings, a model of weighted incentives better predicts behaviour in Stag Hunt games.

Cited by

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Keywords