Assessing the impact of monetary incentives on open defecation: Experimental evidence from a CLTS program in rural Laos

How to cite

Cameron, Lisa; Thomas, Milan; Ljung, Per; Santos, Paulo. 2018. "Assessing the impact of monetary incentives on open defecation: Experimental evidence from a CLTS program in rural Laos." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003408. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3408-2.2

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Lisa Cameron* , Milan Thomas , Per Ljung , Paulo Santos

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003408
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3408-2.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-01-01 – 2019-12-31
Countries
Lao People's Democratic Republic (South East Asia)
JEL codes
I15 Health and Economic Development; I12 Health Behavior; O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Secondary IDs
N/A
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3408

Abstract

Evidence on the effectiveness of Community-Led Total Sanitation programs (CLTS) and latrine subsidies in promoting hygiene practices has been documented in a number of studies, reviewed in Garn et al. (2016). Less is known about how collective and individual financial incentives can interact to improve sanitation for the poorest households. We investigate this question in two provinces of South Laos, where over half of our sample of 2,400 households practiced open defecation at the beginning of our study. We conduct a randomized controlled trial encompassing 160 villages. All households were exposed to CLTS. In treatment groups, we augmented CLTS with packages of financial incentives to test their impacts on hygiene. We are interested in how the incentives promote hygienic behavior across the wealth distribution. This study will provide evidence on the complementarity of small financial incentives to demand-triggering campaigns and their role in promoting equity in areas where sanitation coverage remains low.

Intervention

Between June 2014 and June 2015, a community-led total sanitation (CLTS) program was rolled out in 160 villages across 10 districts of rural Southern Laos by the health ministry (with technical support from the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program). Between February 2015 and June 2017, we complemented the CLTS program by providing packages of financial incentives designed to increase take-up of improved sanitation, especially in poor households.

The incentives offered were:

Village incentive: targeted at village administration, and delivered after verification of open defecation elimination by district health officials. The reward value was around USD 300-500, depending on village size, and could be used at the village head's discretion for any development project.

Promoter+household incentive: targeted at poor households, and delivered after verification of installation and use of pour-flush toilets. The reward value was around USD 20 (roughly equal to a 40% rebate on the cheapest poor flush toilet model without a superstructure). An accompanying reward was targeted at village sanitation promoters (part of village sanitation committee), and delivered upon verified installation of pour-flush toilets by poor households. The promoter reward value was around USD 3 per toilet.

To investigate how individual and community monetary incentives interact with the CLTS program to improve rural sanitation, we randomly assigned the interventions at the village level (see Experimental Design).

Experimental design

160 villages were randomly assigned to one of four equally-sized treatment groups. All groups received Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS). In Treatment Group 1, we also implemented smart subsidies targeted to the poorest 30% of households and provided promoter commissions. In Group 2, open defecation elimination rewards were offered to villages. Group 3 included all incentives in Groups 1 and 2. Group 4 is the control group, which received CLTS with no individual or community incentives.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization on site by lottery coordinated by World Bank Water and Sanitation Program.
Randomization unit
Village level randomization.
Clusters
160 villages.
Observations
2400 households.
Arms
40 villages per treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
Latrine construction, open defecation, caretaker reported diarrhea prevalence and diarrhea symptoms, children’s height- and weight-for-age.
Secondary outcomes
Social cohesion.

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Keywords