Anchoring bias in markets

How to cite

Ioannidis, Konstantinos; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph. 2018. "Anchoring bias in markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003402. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3402-2.0

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Konstantinos Ioannidis* , Theo Offerman , Randolph Sloof

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003402
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3402-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2018-10-22 – 2018-12-30
Countries
Netherlands (Europe)
JEL codes
D01, D02, D91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3402

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the information revealed during market participation reduces the anchoring bias observed in individual decision making. We control the amount of information available in the market using 3 different market settings: a double auction, bilateral bargaining, and a control treatment in which a good different from the anchored one is traded. Anchors are created randomly for each individual subject by rolling a 10-sided die twice; using a median split subjects are divided into a low anchor group and a high anchor group. The main question of interest is whether the difference in the willingness to pay between the low anchor and the high anchor group observed before market participation is eliminated after the market participation.

Intervention

Anchoring is attempted by the following Yes/No question: Would you sell the good back to the experimenter for X€? X is created randomly by rolling a 10-sided die twice. After the anchoring question, participants interact in a market: either a double auction, bilateral bargaining, or in a double auction for a different good (control treatment).

Experimental design

We anchor subjects with a random price and compare their WTA for a good before and after participating in a market. Three types of market settings are studied: a double auction, bilateral bargaining, and a double auction for a different good.

Design details

Randomization method
For each individual subject, the random anchor is obtained from two (10-sided) die rolls.
Randomization unit
Subjects are randomly assigned treatment market setting before a session starts. Within each market setting, a median split on the random anchors defines the Low Anchor and the High Anchor groups.
Clusters
480 participants from 30 sessions with 16 participants in each.
Observations
480 participants
Arms
160 participants in the Double Auction treatment (80 in Low Anchor group and 80 in High Anchor Group) 160 participants in the Bilateral Bargaining treatment (80 in Low Anchor group and 80 in High Anchor Group) 160 participants in the Control treatment (80 in Low Anchor group and 80 in High Anchor Group) (We may encounter problems with the size of our subject pool. If we cannot manage to have 480 subjects, we will have less in the Control treatment.)
Primary outcomes
Willingness To Accept (WTA) both before and after the market participation. The low and the high anchor group will be determined by a median split. We will also compare the difference in WTA before and after market experience between the highest quartile and lowest quartile of the anchor distribution.
Secondary outcomes
Probability of a trade, Speed of a trade, Price of a trade

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Ioannidis, K., Offerman, T., & Sloof, R. (2020). On the effect of anchoring on valuations when the anchor is transparently uninformative. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 6(1), 77-94. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40881-020-00094-1

Cited by

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Keywords