Non-financial Incentives of Community Health Workers in Guinea-Bissau
How to cite
Molina-Millán, Teresa; Vicente, Pedro; Fracchia, Mattia. 2018. "Non-financial Incentives of Community Health Workers in Guinea-Bissau." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003399. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3399-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Community Health Workers (CHWs) programs are becoming increasingly popular in sub-Saharan Africa. In recent years, community health workers have become an essential part of national and international health strategies on the delivery of health care in the region. At the same time, there is a concern that the low motivation of CHWs may threaten the potential benefits of investing in CHW programs. This study wants to investigate to what extent a model in which non-financial incentives are offered on top of basic monetary benefits can result in a sustainable and effective system to incentivize CHWs. First, we study incentives activating intrinsic motivation of the agents, related to the pro-social characteristics of the CHW role and non-monetary rewards targeting the extrinsic motivation of the agents, such as social recognition in the community. Second, this study wants also to test whether the dissemination of information on CHWs’ work in targeted communities could improve the effectiveness of the program. Finally, we will also devote attention to the possible complementary between the different non-financial incentive schemes, as well as to the complementary between incentive schemes and more informed beneficiaries.
Intervention
1. Intrinsic Motivation:
The treatment on intrinsic motivation has as objective to increase the performance of the agents through an alteration in what we claim is their level of intrinsic motivation, i.e. doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable. We will intervene through a manipulation of task significance level using an first-person recorded interactive video making salient the Social Impact of the CHW task (Grant 2008). Social Impact understood as the extent to which employees feel that their own actions improve the welfare of others. The video replicates daily activities of an agent, and offers different stories that materialize as the CHW plays the video. During the video, the agent faces a single central-interactive decision on how much effort to elicit virtually Depending on the choice, different consequences will come up. Within this treatment, a group of agents also visualize a short video in which a traditional healer endorse the CHW role in the community. In addition, another group of agents visualize a placebo-static video in which they do not have to make any decision.
2. Social Status:
This intervention aim to test the effect of social recognition in the general effort of agents. All agents participating in this intervention who reach an established performance threshold will receive an award in a public ceremony. The prize is symbolic and has no monetary value. On top of the prize and the ceremony, all the households assigned to a winner CHW receive a text message to inform them that such an agent outperforms and won an award.
3. Information Campaign:
All the households assigned to an agent in this treatment receive 3 distinct messages with information about the CHW work. This intervention aims to facilitate the introduction of the agents to the household, and at the same time increase households’ interest and understanding about CHW work.
We implemented 3 rounds of each intervention.
Experimental design
The identification of the causal effects of the incentive schemes and the information campaign is based on random assignment of the treatments at the individual level (intrinsic motivation and information campaign) and the neighborhood level (social status). By comparing different groups of individuals, we can isolate the effects of each intervention and shed light on the fundamental questions posed above, without being plagued by methodological problems related to endogeneity of incentives and information.
The interventions in this project are as follow:
1. Neighborhood-level treatment assignment allowing the identification of the effects of Social Status Incentives on CHWs’ performance (all SAB-76 neighborhoods):
(a) Control Group (C) (38 neighborhoods)
(b) Social Status Treatment (TSS) (38 neighborhoods)
2. First level of agent-level treatment assignment within neighborhoods in groups C and TSS: We will randomly assign all agents in the 76 neighborhoods to one of the following 2 interventions:
(a) Individual level control group (Ca). These agents will have no intervention related to information campaign (508 CHWs).
(b) Information Campaign (TIC). Households assigned to CHW in this group receive information about CHW program through a set of text messages (507 CHWs).
3. Second level of agent-level treatment assignment within neighborhoods and Information Campaign Treatment groups.
(a) Intrinsic Motivation control group (CIMa): These agents will have no intervention related to intrinsic motivation incentives (254 CHWs)
(b) Intrinsic Motivation Incentives (TIM)-Placebo: Agents are exposed to a static version of the interactive video in which they do not have to make any decision (254 CHWs)
(c) Intrinsic Motivation Incentives (TIM): Agents are exposed to an interactive video (254 CHWs)
(d) Intrinsic Motivation Incentives (TIM)-Traditional Healer. Agents are exposed to an interactive video and to a message from a traditional healer supporting CHWs activities (254 CHWs)
Design details
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