Do Matching Contributions incentivize informal workers to participate in retirement saving plans? A Randomized Evaluation in Peru

How to cite

Bernal, Noelia; Molina, Oswaldo; Galiani, Sebastian. 2019. "Do Matching Contributions incentivize informal workers to participate in retirement saving plans? A Randomized Evaluation in Peru." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003395. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3395-2.0

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Noelia Bernal* , Oswaldo Molina , Sebastian Galiani

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003395
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3395-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2017-12-05 – 2021-03-31
Countries
Peru (Lima)
JEL codes
C93, J46, J32, D14
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3395

Abstract

This field experiment analyzes whether a Matching Defined Contribution (MDC) scheme is an effective incentive to increase enrollment and contributions in retirement saving plans. Our intervention involves transferring funds into workers’ pension funds, conditional on their own contributions. The research proposes three pension plans: 100%, 50%, and 0% MDC (subject to a maximum amount) for six months. These plans are offered to informal workers from micro firms located in the city of Lima, Peru, who were not previously enrolled in the pension system.

Intervention

The MDC scheme is applied between three different groups of workers, two of them receive a monthly matching incentive of 100% (full match) or 50% (partial match), and a third one, which is the control group, receives 0% (no match). We match 100% of the contribution or 50% of it up to a monthly maximum amount of USD 42 and six months after enrollment. All groups receive detailed information about the importance of saving for retirement, the peruvian pension system and the benefits of enrolling to the Private Pension System. Since all three groups receive the same kind of information, we are able to estimate the effect of the matching incentive.

Experimental design

Our unit of analysis are the workers from the micro firms located in Lima. The unit of randomization is the micro firm, since it was the only mean we could use to reach the worker. These firms need to be registered in two administrative databases. After visiting the firms, we found that an important number of them could not be located or were closed, so we excluded them from the analysis. We also had to keep only workers who were not previously enrolled in the pension system. Therefore, our final sample comprises 3,038 workers from 2,770 micro firms and it is representative of the informal workers from micro firms located in Lima, who were not previously enrolled in any pension system. Treatment assignment is as follows: 912 workers in the control group, 1,063 in the 50% matching group and 1,063 in the 100% matching group.

Design details

Randomization method
Stratified Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Firm
Clusters
2,770 micro firms
Observations
3,038 workers
Arms
835 micro firms control, and 968 micro firms in the 50% matching group and 967 micro firms in the 100% matching group.
Primary outcomes
1) Enrollment to the Pension Fund 2) Contribution to the Pension Fund.

Cited by

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Keywords