Project Generasi: Conditional community block grants in Indonesia
How to cite
Olken, Benjamin; Sacks, Audrey; Onishi, Junko; Wong, Susan. 2014. "Project Generasi: Conditional community block grants in Indonesia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000332. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.332-3.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We report an experiment in 3,000 villages that tested whether incentives improve aid efficacy. Villages received block grants for maternal and child health and education that incorporated relative performance incentives. Subdistricts were randomized into incentives, an otherwise identical program without incentives, or control. Incentives initially improved preventative health indicators, particularly in underdeveloped areas, and spending efficiency increased. While school enrollments improved overall, incentives had no differential impact on education, and incentive health effects diminished over time. Reductions in neonatal mortality in non-incentivized areas did not persist with incentives. We find no scoring manipulation and no funding reallocation toward richer areas.
In 2016-2017, we returned to the same locations for a followup study. Since 2010 all locations were using the incentivized version of the program, but the original randomization into treatment and control subdistricts was almost entirely intact.
Intervention
A total of 264 subdistricts were randomized into either a comparison group or one of the two versions of the Generasi program: the “incentivized” version with a pay-for-performance component, or the otherwise identical, “non-incentivized” version without pay-for-performance incentives.
Experimental design
The randomization was conducted at the subdistrict (kecamatan) level, so all villages within a subdistrict either received the same version (either all incentivized or all non- incentivized) or were in the control group. Since some services (e.g. health services, junior secondary schools) service multiple villages within the same subdistrict, but rarely serve people from other subdistricts, randomizing at the subdistrict level and treating all villages within the subdistrict estimates the program’s true net impact, rather than possible reallocations among villages. A total of 264 eligible subdistricts were randomized into either one of the two treatment groups or the control group.
In the first year, both treatment groups received program funds based on the number of target beneficiaries in each village (i.e. the number of children and the expected number of pregnant women). In the second year, funds were allocated in the same way in non-incentivized villages, but in incentivized villages 20 percent of the funds were distributed based on village’s performance on the 12 indicators during the last year. The purpose of this bonus was to increase villages’ effort at achieving the targeted indicators, both by encouraging a more effective allocation of funds and by stimulating increased efforts to encourage mothers and children to obtain appropriate health care and increase educational enrollment and attendance.
The block grants averaged US$8,500 in the first year of the program and US$13,500 in the second year of the program. To decide how to spend the grant money, trained facilitators helped each village elect an 11-member village management team, as well as select local facilitators and volunteers. Consultation workshops were then held with local health and education providers to gather information and technical assistance, and coordinate the use of the funds.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Olken, Benjamin A., Junko Onishi, and Susan Wong, "Should Aid Reward Performance? Evidence from a field experiment on health and education in Indonesia," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, forthcoming. http://economics.mit.edu/files/9379
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