Equity and Incentives in Human Capital Investment: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment
How to cite
Herbst, Daniel; Palacios, Miguel; Yannelis, Constantine. 2020. "Equity and Incentives in Human Capital Investment: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003290. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3290-2.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We conduct a field experiment in Latin America that randomly offers individuals different monthly payment obligations (debt) in exchange for pledging varying shares of their future incomes (equity). Our experimental design identifies selection and treatment effects across both debt and equity dimensions of the experimental offers. Specifically, we randomly offer enrollees in income-share agreements (ISAs) the opportunity to lower their pledged income shares by 5 or 10 percentage points in exchange for flat monthly fees ranging from 25,000 to 400,000 pesos. To identify moral hazard, we estimate the treatment effect of accepting a contract with a lower income-share obligation, using contract offers as instruments. To identify adverse selection, we compare individuals who received different menus of offers but ultimately pledged the same income share. Estimating treatment effects and selection patterns in earnings, repayment, and risk factors enables us to quantify the welfare losses associated with information asymmetries in equity-like contracts and identify market failures in household financing.
Intervention
We randomly offer existing ISA enrollees the opportunity to lower their pledged income shares by 5 or 10 percentage points in exchange for flat monthly fees ranging from 1,000 to 400,000 pesos. To identify moral hazard, we estimate the treatment effect of accepting a contract with a lower income-share obligation, using contract offers as instruments. To identify adverse selection, we compare individuals who received different menus of offers but ultimately pledged the same income share.
Experimental design
Our experiment involves randomly extending revised contract offerings to graduates enrolled in Lumni ISAs. These contract offerings will take the form of “discounts” to income-share obligations in exchange for an additional up-front payment.
Consider an ISA enrollee three years after graduation who is obligated to pay 15 percent of her annual income to Lumni over the next two years. In the first wave of the experiment, one experimental treatment would offer that student a revised contract reducing her income-share obligation to 10 percent in exchange for an additional 70,000 pesos per month. Another treatment offers the same five-percentage-point reduction for 1,000 pesos, and another treatment group offers a ten-percentage-point reduction for 70,000 pesos.
In the second wave of the experiment, roughly two years after Wave 1, we extend both 70,000 pesos treatment offers to 16 additional ISA enrollees as well as 26 of the original control group from Wave 1.
Design details
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