Communication in Bargaining with an Endogenous Fund
How to cite
Cox, Caleb; Baranski, Andrzej. 2018. "Communication in Bargaining with an Endogenous Fund." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003254. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3254-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We will investigate how the ability to communicate via anonymous computerized text chat and observability of individual contributions affect behavior in a three-person legislative bargaining game with contributed funds. We will examine how these features of the game influence bargaining power and outcomes.
Experimental design
There are four experimental conditions, all of which involve a bargaining game in which players first make contributions to a group fund, and then a random proposer allocates the resulting group fund among players. Players can vote on whether or not to accept the proposal. If the proposal is rejected, another random proposer is selected.
Condition NCNO is the baseline without communication or observable contributions.
Condition CNO introduces communication without observable contributions.
Condition NCO introduces observable contributions without communication.
Condition CO combines both communication and observable contributions.
Design details
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