Common-value public goods and informational social dilemmas

How to cite

Cox, Caleb; Stoddard, Brock. 2018. "Common-value public goods and informational social dilemmas." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003253. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3253-2.0

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Caleb Cox* , Brock Stoddard

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003253
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3253-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-01-29 – 2017-06-06
Countries
United States of America (Richmond, VA)
JEL codes
C72, D83, H41
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3253

Abstract

We experimentally examine the role of private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a public goods game in which the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the true MPCR and then send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthful communication, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that messages are largely truthful and influence contribution decisions. In further treatments, we increase the incentive to exaggerate and find reduced truthfulness and smaller gains from communication.

Experimental design

We include the following experimental conditions:
Baseline: public goods game with uncertain marginal per capita return (MPCR) drawn from {0,1.1}
Signals: like Baseline, but with private signals correlated with the true MPCR (equals true MPCR with 80% probability).
Cheap Talk: like Signals, but players send messages to one another after observing signals, but before contribution decisions
Signals SR: like Signals, but with a smaller range of possible MPCR values, {0.3,0.8}.
Cheap Talk SR: like Cheap Talk, but with a smaller range of possible MPCR values, {0.3,0.8}.
Signals WS: like Signals, but with weaker signal (equals true MPCR with 70% probability).
Cheap Talk WS: like Cheap Talk, but with weaker signal (equals true MPCR with 70% probability).
Cheap Talk Strat: like Cheap Talk, but choices in each round (message sent, contribution decision) made using strategy method.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by computer.
Randomization unit
Groups of participants (sessions) are randomized to experimental conditions.
Clusters
38 sessions
Observations
426 participants
Arms
Baseline: 42 participants Signals: 45 participants Cheap Talk: 96 participants Signals SR: 33 participants Cheap Talk SR: 72 participants Signals WS: 36 participants Cheap Talk WS: 78 participants Cheap Talk Strat: 24 participants
Primary outcomes
messages sent to other players (truthful or untruthful reporting of private signals); contribution decisions

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords