The Political Economy of Ethnicity in the Democratic Republic of Congo

How to cite

Lowes, Sara; Nunn, Nathan; Weigel, Jonathan; Bergeron, Augustin; Robinson, James. 2018. "The Political Economy of Ethnicity in the Democratic Republic of Congo." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003251. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3251-1.0

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Sara Lowes* , Nathan Nunn , Jonathan Weigel , Augustin Bergeron , James Robinson

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003251
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3251-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2014-06-01 – 2020-09-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3251

Abstract

We study the extent to which politics can shape ethnic preferences. We exploit time variation in political competition between ethnic groups caused by an episode of decentralization that increases in the number of provinces from 11 to 26 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Decentralization changes the extent to which different ethnic groups are key players in the political arena. In the region of interest, groups that were previously unimportant politically will become key players, and groups that were political competitors previously will gain majority control of their own province. We use a series of lab-in-the-field experiments, IATs, and surveys to examine how ethnic preferences change as a result of the decentralization process and evolve over time.

Intervention

The study exploits time variation in political competition between ethnic groups due to an episode of decentralization that increases in the number of provinces from 11 to 26 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). With the decentralization, there will be significant changes in the extent to which different ethnic groups are key players in the political arena. In the region of interest, in some cases, groups that were previously unimportant politically will become key players e.g., the Kuba and Lele. In other cases, groups that were political competitors previously, due to the creation of smaller provinces, will each gain majority control of their own province e.g., Songe, Tetela, and Luba.

Experimental design

We use a series of lab-in-the-field experiments, IATs, and surveys to examine how ethnic preferences change as a result of the decentralization process in DRC and how these preferences evolve over time.

Design details

Randomization method
We exploit the time variation in the political competition between various ethnic groups induced by the decentralization process. Thus, all individuals are treated in the sense that they are all exposed to the changes in administrative boundaries due to decentralization. What will vary is the intensity of the change in relative position of ethnic groups vis a vis each other. E.g. in some cases, a group that was previously a minority group will become a majority group relative to other groups in the new administrative boundaries.
Randomization unit
This is a natural experiment. Treatment will vary at the individual-ethnicity pair level. All individuals are treated in that they are all exposed to the changes in administrative boundaries, what varies is the intensity of treatment across ethnicity pairs.
Clusters
N/A
Observations
We intend to collect around 300 observations per round of data collection. We have collected data from 2014, 2015, and 2016.
Arms
The intended sample size is approximately 300 individuals per year of data collection. To date we have collected data in 2014, 2015, and 2016. The final sample size will be around 1,800.
Primary outcomes
The outcome variables are choices made in the lab experiments, IAT measures, and survey measures related to ethnic preferences.

Cited by

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Keywords