Impacts of Asset Collateralized Loans
How to cite
Suri, Tavneet; Laat, Joost de; Jack, William; Kremer, Michael. 2018. "Impacts of Asset Collateralized Loans." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003177. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3177-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We examine the impact of replacing loans with high down payments and stringent guarantor requirements with asset-collateralized loans, similar to the mortgages and car loans that are common in developed countries. In particular, we studied a Kenyan dairy's saving and credit cooperative which randomly offered different borrowing conditions to different members for a loan for a particular asset: a 5000 liter water tank. The cooperative's standard borrowing conditions required that one third of loans be secured with deposits by the borrower, and that the remaining two thirds be secured with cash or shares from guarantors. In this study, we compare this loan contract to less stringent loan contracts to study how these requirements affect take up and loan repayments. We also conduct a number of different surveys to study the impacts of the water tanks themselves.
Intervention
The intervention is a credit intervention, in collaboration with a savings and credit cooperative (SACCO). The main intervention covered 1804 farmers who were offered a loan for a 5000 liter plastic water tank worth 24,000 Kenyan shillings (approximately $320). The loans were rolled out between March and October 2010.
The loan capital could only be used to purchase the water tank. Once the loan contracts with the SACCO was signed, the SACCO delivered the tanks to the farmer's house. The loans were to be paid over 24 months, with a month principal payment of KShs 1,000 due a month. The interest charged by the SACCO was 1% on a declining balance.
A second phase of loans was rolled out between February and April 2012, covering 2600 farmers. This was conducted as an out of sample test of the loan contracts.
Experimental design
The 1804 farmers were randomly divided into the following groups of loan contracts:
Group A: an asset collateralized loan that required a standard small deposit of Ksh 1,000 (4%) from the borrower [510 farmers]
Group G: an asset collateralized loan that required a single guarantor to back Ksh 5,000 (21%) of the loan against default in addition to the standard small deposit of Ksh 1,000 (4%) from the borrower [425 farmers]
Group D: an asset collateralized loan that required a larger deposit of Ksh 5000 (21%) along with the standard small deposit of Ksh 1,000 (4%), all from the borrower [450 farmers]
Group C: a 100% cash collateralized joint liability loan that required up to 3 guarantors to pledge Ksh 16,000 (2/3rd of the loan amount) against default in addition to a deposit of Ksh 8000 (1/3rd of loan amount) from the borrower [419 farmers]
In addition, the farmers in Groups D and G were further split into two sub-groups to isolate the effect of guarantors and deposit requirement on farmers. We randomly divided Group D & G into the following sub-groups, Group DM , Group DW , Group GM , and Group GW wherein M implies maintained and W implies waived.
Group GM - The terms of the loan and guarantor deposit amounts were maintained
Group GW - After the first month installment, the guarantors were released of their responsibility for the loan in the event of default and their deposits of Ksh 5000 were returned.This implied that the farmers in this sub-group assumed full responsibility for repayment with the asset (water tank) as collateral, just as in Group A.
Group DM - The terms of the loans and deposit requirements were maintained.
Group DW - After the first month installment , the farmers were given back Ksh 5000 (21%) of their deposit. This left the farmers in this sub-group with the standard small deposit of Ksh 1000 (4%) just as in Group A.
All farmers in these two groups are informed of the 50% possibility of their loans being modified at the time they sign their loan agreements.
As a result of the sub-division, all the farmers in Group A, Group DW, and Group GW have identical loan terms of having Ksh 1000 deposit, no guarantors, and being asset-collateralized. Therefore, any difference in take-up and repayment rates across the groups can be attributed to the underlying characteristics derived from the selection of the sample. Any difference in repayment in Group DM and Group DW is due to the incentive effect of having a larger deposit (Ksh 6000 vs Ksh 1000); and any difference between Group GM, and Group GW can be attributed to the incentive effects of requiring a guarantor.
Design details
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