Local Monitoring of Teacher Attendance in Afghanistan

How to cite

Fiorin, Stefano. 2018. "Local Monitoring of Teacher Attendance in Afghanistan." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003172. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3172-2.0

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Stefano Fiorin*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003172
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3172-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2018-04-01 – 2018-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3172

Abstract

In this project, we study the willingness of teachers to report on the absenteeism of their colleagues. Teachers in a control group are told that their reports will be used only for an academic study, and will not be forwarded to the Ministry of Education (MoE). Teachers in the "low punishment" group will be told that the reports might be forwarded to the MoE, and that this might trigger a minor punishment like a small salary reduction. Teachers in the "high punishment" group are told that the reports might be forwarded to the MoE, which has recently instituted a committee for fighting absenteeism, and that reports might trigger serious punishments like contract terminations. This allows us to study whether teachers value having absentees punished, or if instead, they want to protect their colleagues, and how this varies with the severity of punishment. We interact this three treatments with monetary incentives and evaluate how they affect the willingness to report.

Intervention

Employees from the MoE will receive phone calls from a research team collaborating with the MoE and will be asked to report on the absenteeism of their colleagues. Employees who are willing to participate will be randomized into six different treatment group along two dimensions. Some employee will be told the reports will only be used for an academic study, while others will be told that reports might trigger punishments (minor or severe) for their colleagues. Some employees will be offered monetary incentives for reporting, while others won't. Employees will then be given the names of ten colleagues and asked whether those colleagues were sometimes absent in the previous week or in the past.

Experimental design

1) control group: employees are told that their reports will be used only for an academic study, and will not be forwarded to the Ministry of Education (MoE);
2) low punishment group: employees are told that the reports might also be forwarded to the MoE and that this might trigger a minor punishment like a small salary reduction;
3) high punishment group: employees are told that the reports might be forwarded to the MoE, which has recently instituted a committee for fighting absenteeism, and that reports might trigger serious punishments like contract terminations;
4) monetary incentives group: employees are told that their reports will be used only for an academic study, and will not be forwarded to the Ministry of Education (MoE); they will also be offered a monetary incentive for each absentee they report;
2) low punishment monetary incentives group: employees are told that the reports might also be forwarded to the MoE and that this might trigger a minor punishment like a small salary reduction; they will also be offered a monetary incentive for each absentee they report;
3) high punishment monetary incentives group: employees are told that the reports might be forwarded to the MoE, which has recently instituted a committee for fighting absenteeism, and that reports might trigger serious punishments like contract terminations; they will also be offered a monetary incentive for each absentee they report.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization will be done on Stata.
Randomization unit
The randomization will be done at the employee level, stratifying the treatment at the school level.
Clusters
About 750 employees.
Observations
About 7500 observations (10 colleagues for each employee).
Arms
control group: 125 employees low punishment group: 125 employees high punishment group: 125 employees monetary incentives group: 125 employees low punishment monetary incentives group: 125 employees high punishment monetary incentives group: 125 employees
Primary outcomes
Willingness to report absenteeism

Cited by

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Keywords