The Heterogeneous Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers

How to cite

Galiani, Sebastian; McEwan, Patrick J.. 2014. "The Heterogeneous Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000317. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.317-4.0

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Sebastian Galiani* , Patrick J. McEwan

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000317
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.317-4.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
1999-10-01 – 2002-10-01
Countries
Honduras ()
JEL codes
H00
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/317

Abstract

The Honduran PRAF experiment randomly assigned conditional cash transfers to 40 of
70 poor municipalities, within five strata defined by a poverty proxy. Using census data, we show that eligible children were 8 percentage points more likely to enroll in school and 3 percentage points less likely to work. The effects were much larger in the two poorest strata, and statistically insignificant in the other three (the latter finding is robust to the use of a separate regression-discontinuity design). Heterogeneity confirms the importance of judicious targeting to maximize the impact and cost-effectiveness of CCTs. There is no consistent evidence of effects on ineligible children or on adult labor supply.

Intervention

70 municipalities were randomly allocated into four groups:

Group 1 (G1) families received health and education transfers
Group 2 (G2) families received health and education transfers; schools and health centers received transfers
Group 3 (G3) only schools and health centers received transfers
Group 4 (G4) served as a comparison

The education transfer, in the amount of 800 Lempiras per year (about US$50), was available to each child between 6 to 12 who enrolled in and regularly attended grades 1 to 4 between the school year of February to November. A health transfer of 644 Lempiras per year (about US$40) was available to children under 3 and pregnant mothers who regularly attended health centers. Households were eligible to receive up to 3 education transfers and up to 2 health transfers.

The 70 municipalities were divided into 5 quintiles based on mean height-for-age, and 8 of 14 municipalities in each quintile were randomly selected to receive transfers.

Experimental design

Under PRAF-II, a revamp of the first Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF), eligible families could receive two kinds of cash transfers. An education transfer of 812 Lempiras/year (about US$50) was available to families with children ages 6 to 12 who were enrolled and regularly attended grades 1-4. A health transfer of 644 Lempiras/year (about US$40) was available to families with children under 3 and pregnant mothers who regularly attended health centers. In practice, school enrollment (but not attendance) was enforced as a condition of the payments, while no health benefits were suspended for failure to attend health centers.

PRAF-II also planned to give cash transfers to schools and health centers of US$4,000 and US$6,000 respectively. However, the distribution of these funds was extremely limited in practice, mostly due to legal hurdles in forming community groups authorized to administer funds.

To target the program, municipalities were ranked based on average height-for-age scores of first graders, and the bottom 70 municipalities were selected for inclusion. The municipalities were then randomly allocated into four groups (as mentioned above under intervention details). For those municipalities in the treatment group, cash transfers were made available for children aged 6-12, who had not yet completed 4th grade.

Design details

Randomization method
N/A
Randomization unit
municipalities
Clusters
70 municipalities
Observations
120,411 students
Arms
G1: 20 municipalities with 38,435 students G2: 20 municipalities with 39,065 students G3: 10 municipalities with 14,154 students G4: 20 municipalities with 28,757 students
Primary outcomes
The main outcomes studied are whether an eligible child for the educational transfer is: Enrolled in school Works outside home Works only in home See Table A.1 in the attached document.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Galiani, S. and P. McEwan, Experimental heterogeneous effects in conditional cash transfers. Journal of Public Economics, 2013, Volume 103, pages 85-96 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1931216

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords