The Choice of Pension Funds - an Information Experiment

How to cite

Kinnerud, Karin; Lorentzon, Louise. 2018. "The Choice of Pension Funds - an Information Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003139. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3139-3.0

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Karin Kinnerud* , Louise Lorentzon

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003139
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3139-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2018-07-16 – 2019-02-10
Countries
Sweden ()
JEL codes
D83, G11, G23
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3139

Abstract

In this research project we empirically investigate why people choose and hold
strictly dominated pension funds. We discriminate between three main hypotheses:
information asymmetry, search costs, and financial illiteracy. An experiment is
conducted where letters are sent to pension savers in two strictly dominated funds
in the Swedish premium pension system. The treatment letters contain different
types of information in combination with incentivized tasks. Approximately 30 000
people save in the two funds for their premium pension, and we treat about 23 000.
Following the letter treatments we observe the real fund choices by the pension
savers, and test the relative importance of the three hypotheses. By randomizing the
different letters to individuals, we can identify potential causes why people choose to
stay with dominated fund choices. Administrative data on background characteristics
is used to study heterogeneous effects. Furthermore, we estimate distributions of
search costs and implied discount factors. By estimating discount factors across age
we test age dependent attention of the pension investment decision.

Experimental design

We conduct an experiment in the Swedish premium pension system. The treatments are
information letters in combination with incentivized tasks to savers in two dominated funds. We use five different treatment letters: Basic1, Basic2, A, C, and Ba. A summary of the treatment letters follows. In addition, there is a control group that receives no letter.

• Basic1: A reminder of the individual’s current choice of fund (the dominated fund)
and a statement that it is not the cheapest index fund with that investment strategy.
Information about the fee difference of the current and the cheapest index fund following
the selected investment strategy. In addition, a short guide describing how a fund
selection is implemented and how one can categorize the current fund.

• Basic2: The Basic1 letter and a statement offering one attempt where the saver
can verify that an identified fund in fact is the dominating index fund of the specific
investment strategy.

• A: The Basic1 letter and information about the name of the cheapest index fund that
follows the same investment strategy as the currently chosen index fund.

• C: Letter A and a statement that clarifies the expected gain in the premium pension
account balance at age 65, from immediately switching to the cheapest index fund in
the chosen index fund category.

• Ba: The Basic2 letter, and a statement that clarifies the expected gain in the premium
pension account balance at age 65, from immediately switching to the cheapest index
fund in the chosen index fund category. Furthermore, we offer an immediate
search reward (four different amounts, a: 0, L, M, H) if the recipient of the letter reports the name of the
dominating fund to us. Note that we do not inform the saver of the name of the cheapest
index fund in the category.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is done in an office by a computer, specifically, using the program Stata.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is individual. The individuals in the sample (premium pension savers in the two dominated funds) are divided into strata based on: year of birth (2 groups, split by the midpoint of the age range), labor income (2 quantiles), fund choice (medium fee fund, high fee fund), and fund share (2 quantiles). Treatment groups (Control, Basic1, Basic2, A, C, B0, BL, BM, BH) are randomly assigned within strata.
Clusters
We construct 16 strata, based on year of birth (2 groups, split by the midpoint of the age range), labor income (2 quantiles), fund choice (medium fee fund, high fee fund), and fund share (2 quantiles).
Observations
About 23 000 individuals are treated and roughly 7 000 individuals are left as controls.
Arms
For the treatment arms we have the following number of individuals: - Basic1: 2 500, where 250 receive reading test - Basic2: 2 500 - A: 5 000, where 250 receive reading test - C: 5 000 - B0: 5 000 - BL,BM,BH: 2 520 (840 for each level of reward)
Primary outcomes
The outcome variables of interest include: - an indicator variable for switching from the dominated to the dominating fund; - an indicator variable for switching from the dominated to another fund; - the portfolio share invested in the dominated fund; - an indicator variable for completing a search task (we study both those who successfully complete the search task, and those who complete the search task but provide an answer that is incorrect); - an indicator variable for confirming reading a letter. If possible, we will also look at the number of logins at the Pensions Agency’s website (at an individual level), and the average fund fee in the chosen portfolio. When we observe changes in the outcome variables we also analyze the exact date at which changes were made, for the relevant individuals.
Secondary outcomes
We estimate distributions of search costs and implied discount factors.

Papers from this trial

  1. In this paper we empirically investigate potential causes of imperfect competition in the fund market, as characterized by high price dispersion among comparable funds. We discriminate between three … https://www.dropbox.com/s/kwuu8i4tmxz4jhd/Kinnerud_Lorentzon.pdf?dl=0

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Keywords