Understanding Demand for Electricity Among Rural Consumers Using Pay as You Go Solar

How to cite

Lang, Megan. 2018. "Understanding Demand for Electricity Among Rural Consumers Using Pay as You Go Solar." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003138. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3138-2.0

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Megan Lang*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003138
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3138-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2018-07-01 – 2019-06-30
Countries
Kenya (Western region and Nyanza region), Rwanda (Entire country excluding Kigali)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3138

Abstract

What is the willingness to pay for reliable electricty among rural consumers in developing countries, and how responsive is demand to changes in the price of electricity? Electrification is a major growth policy challenge for developing countries, as it requires large investments in infrastructure while consumers' and producers' willingness to pay for electricity in low income countries remains largely unknown. These challenges are exacerbated in rural areas, where potential consumers of electricity tend to be poorer and the costs of extending access to the grid higher than in urban markets. I use a randomized control trial (RCT) with customers of a pay as you go (PAYG) solar company in Rwanda and Kenya to study demand for electricity among rural consumers by randomly varying the effective price of electricity for different consumers. This experimental design allows me to estimate the price elasticity of demand for electricity and to trace out the demand curve for electricity. Because customers have a solar home system that includes a battery for storing electricity generated during daylight hours, consumers have reliable access to electricity as long as they purchase system access time. Therefore, my estimates of consumer demand will be estimates of demand for reliable access to electricity. Furthermore, consumers in my sample purchase all appliances except mobile phones from the solar provider, nearly all of which are primarily for consumption. These features of my experimental setting enable me to contribute to understanding demand for reliable electricity for consumption among rural consumers.

In addition to providing evidence on the nature of demand for electricity among rural consumers, I will contribute to the growing body of evidence on the benefits of rural electrification. Measuring the benefits of electricity for consumption is particularly challenging, as it requires valuing difficult to measure benefits like increased leisure time, long-term improvements in health outcomes, improvements in educational outcomes, and enhanced feelings of safety and security (CGAP 2017). Rather than attempting to directly value such benefits, I take a novel approach by applying the techniques developed in Ligon (2016) to measure households' marginal utility of expenditure. I plan to supplement this with a structural estimate of welfare.

Intervention

I offer promotions to existing customers of a pay as you go (PAYG) solar company that randomly vary the effective price that the customer pays for a day of electricity.

Experimental design

I randomly offer payment incentives to existing customers of a solar company in Rwanda and Kenya. PAYG solar customers purchase time on their solar home systems rather than kilowatt hours. Therefore, incentives take one of two forms. The first incentive is of the form "purchase X days and receive Y days free." The second incentive is of the form "purchase X days over the course of a month and receive Y days free at the end of the month." For each type of incentive, I randomly offer some customers a high discount, or a high number of free days, and others a low discount. The discounts range between 3.5-15% on the low discount schedule and 7-24% on the high discount schedule, with discounts increasing in the number of days purchased for both types of incentives. Finally, I offer some customers discounts starting at a low minimum threshold and others discounts starting at a high minimum threshold. This cross-randomized experimental design induces random variation in the effective price of electricity. Finally, I offer a simple information treatment that merely informs customers about how well they have to pay to be considered "good customers" by the solar company.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is done in an office by a computer.
Randomization unit
The randomization is done at the level of the individual customer, there is no clustering. I stratify by past payment performance so that there are sufficient numbers of previously well-paying and previously poor-paying customers to examine effects on each.
Clusters
2400 individual customers.
Observations
2400 individual customers.
Arms
400 - pure control 400 - information treatment 200 - reliability incentive, low discount rate, low minimum threshold 200 - reliability incentive, low discount rate, high minimum threshold 200 - reliability incentive, high discount rate, low minimum threshold 200 - reliability incentive, high discount rate, high minimum threshold 200 - bulk incentive, low discount rate, low minimum threshold 200 - bulk incentive, low discount rate, high minimum threshold 200 - bulk incentive, high discount rate, low minimum threshold 200 - bulk incentive, high discount rate, high minimum threshold Note that when performing power calculations, I am presenting power calculations for 800 treated individuals (in a given type of incentive) compared to 800 control individual (the pure control combined with the information treatment). All sub-analyses will have less power in accordance with the reduced sample.
Primary outcomes
Days of electricity purchased in a single month, marginal utility of expenditure.
Secondary outcomes
Frequency of remote lockouts, duration of remote lockouts, customer satisfaction.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Lang, Megan (2026). "Using price incentives to bound welfare from pay as you go solar electricity." Journal of Public Economics, 259. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105656

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords