Do Nudges Improve Firms' Compliance with Environmental Regulations?

How to cite

Armstrong, Sarah; Greenstone, Michael; Gazze, Ludovica. 2018. "Do Nudges Improve Firms' Compliance with Environmental Regulations?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003134. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3134-1.0

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Sarah Armstrong* , Michael Greenstone , Ludovica Gazze

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003134
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3134-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2018-07-09 – 2020-05-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3134

Abstract

The goal of this project is to reduce effluent violations under the Clean Water Act (CWA) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed an automated, facility-targeted messaging system to encourage compliance with NPDES permit limits and reduce overall effluent levels. This study will examine how effective early forms of notifications or warnings could be in inducing facilities to self-correct problems before they become chronic violators. We will evaluate the impact of this notification system on compliance through a randomized controlled trial (RCT), which will generate evidence on both the overall effectiveness of the system at changing effluent violation rates and which configurations of messaging duration and recipient have the greatest impact on facility effluent discharges.

Experimental design

The aim of this experiment is to determine whether automatically generated notifications incentivize compliance with the Clean Water Act and reduce overall effluent levels. Companies in four U.S. states were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups that vary by the duration of time in which a company is eligible to receive notifications and whether upper management within the company receive notifications in addition to the employee that submitted the data detailing waste water discharges.

Companies are randomly assigned to one of the four following treatment groups: (1) Companies are eligible to receive notifications upon each effluent exceedance identification throughout the study; (2) companies are eligible to receive notifications for a shortened duration during the study; (3) companies are eligible to receive notifications throughout the study and signatories' managers also receive notifications; or, (4) companies receive no notifications. Additionally, half of facilities associated with companies assigned to (1) or (2) are assigned to receive no notifications during the study.

Design details

Randomization method
We randomly assign companies to treatment groups using a minimum-maximum p-value re-randomization algorithm (Bruhn & McKenzie, 2009) to improve balance of key variables across treatment groups (balance covariates).
Randomization unit
Our primary unit of randomization is parent companies, with half of facilities with parent companies assigned to groups (1) and (2) assigned to receive no intervention.
Clusters
370 parent companies
Observations
438 facilities
Arms
Treatment group (1) 114 parent companies; treatment group (2) 120 parent companies; treatment group (3) 29 parent companies; treatment group (4) 107 companies (control group)
Primary outcomes
* Discharge index: The (quarterly) mean standardized effluent level of the ith company at time t * Discharge relative to permit: The (quarterly) mean standardized effluent level relative to the permitted level of the ith company at time t * Probability of violation A compliance indicator, equal to one (1) if company i reported at least one effluent limit exceedance during time t and 0 otherwise We standardize effluent levels within groups defined by various Discharge Monitoring Report and permit limit value characteristics, including unit of measurement and whether a value is a concentration or quantity. This results in a standardized (z-score) measure of effluent levels, and effluent levels as standardized deviations relative to the permit limit. Because our randomization is implemented at the company-level, our primary outcome variables are company-level indices (means) of these standardized effluent levels at the quarter-year level.

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Keywords