Interactive versus non-interactive implementations of "Dictator Games"

How to cite

Nax, Heinrich; Grech, Philip. 2018. "Interactive versus non-interactive implementations of "Dictator Games"." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003121. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3121-1.1

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Heinrich Nax* , Philip Grech

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003121
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3121-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-11-20 – 2017-11-23
Countries
Switzerland ()
JEL codes
A13, C72, D01, D64
Secondary IDs
https://osf.io/fsg52/
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3121

Abstract

This is a re-registry (after data collection and analysis) to accompany our study, which was pre-regiistered at the OSF in November 2017.

Situations where one gives up own material payoff in order to increase someone else's material payoff are ubiquitous. In experimental economics, they are modeled as ‘dictator games’ and have been analyzed in great depth. What has gone unnoticed is that there are many games that are being studied under the label 'dictator game' in the laboratory, and that these game differ critically with respect to whether the underlying context is such that one player only gives and another player only receives, or whether players give and take at the same time. These two protocols come with crucially different (Nash) equilibrium predictions, even if players are allowed to have substantially pro-social preferences. Across the experimental literature, there has been a shift from the former –‘non-interactive’– dictator game implementation to the latter –‘interactive’– dictator game implementation. In this study, we will therefore implement dictator games using both protocols to improve our understanding of how these different protocols affect giving decisions.

Intervention

The main hypotheses concern fundamental differences in giving decisions between the two protocols: The non-interactive protocol predicts intermediate payments if a subject has some distributional and altruistic concern for the recipient's material well-being. By contrast, Nash equilibria of the games induced by the interactive protocol are characterized by extremal payments (either full or null payments), and in particular by increased levels of zero-giving for low prices of redistribution.

Additional hypotheses can be tested by varying the 'price of redistribution' p, that is, the factor by which each unit of material payoff that is given up is multiplied and sent to the recipient: in the interactive protocol, the Nash equilibrium prediction is that the peak at null (full) decreases (increases) in p.

We do a standard economic experiment conducted online. Recruitment will be done through a pre-registered subject pool from Amazon's Mechanical Turk, as used by the Decision Science Laboratory of ETH Zurich. Earnings will include a fixed show-up fee, and a variable bonus that depends on decisions of the subjects. We will not exclude any specific set of subjects except for ones that took part in dictator game experiments in the last three months, and we will pay subjects based on the decisions they take during the experiment according to online experiments standards. We aim to run the study before January 2018.

We plan to run 5 sessions of two-times-both treatments involving 20 active decision-making participants per session per treatment = 200 active subjects per treatment, which leads to a total of 600 subjects (of which 200 are inactive "recipients" in one of the treatments).

Experimental design

We will compare the resulting two giving distributions using various standard statistics including the arithmetic mean, median, variance, as well as higher moments of the distribution and other distributional measures such as bimodality, etc. In addition, we will define dummy variables for extremal (zero and full) giving decisions.

Design details

Randomization method
We run a standard two-group, between-subject experiment, with random allocation of roles (dictator vs recipient) in the non-interactive protocol. We will balance sessions by day and time. In each session, half of the subjects per session are randomly matched into one of two treatments and into one of the two games played per treatment, each subject playing exactly one protocol. In addition, there will be random allocation of roles (dictator vs recipient) in the non-interactive protocol. Active players will face decision situations in random order. Payment is based on one randomly selected decision per dictator.
Randomization unit
Since we are comparing the protocols between-subject, we implement the experiment in the interest of budget and reasonable statistical power to have at least n=200 active subjects per treatment. A total of 600 participants is about as much as we can afford given our budget situation. Recruiting fewer subjects is not desirable as previous experimental from dictator games (under either protocol) consistently shows that a proportion of subjects (up to 50% in total) always and independent of treatment give either nothing or half, thus reducing the variation of people that could be affected by treatment variations.
Clusters
Since we are comparing the protocols between-subject, we implement the experiment in the interest of budget and reasonable statistical power to have at least n=200 active subjects per treatment. A total of 600 participants is about as much as we can afford given our budget situation. Recruiting fewer subjects is not desirable as previous experimental from dictator games (under either protocol) consistently shows that a proportion of subjects (up to 50% in total) always and independent of treatment give either nothing or half, thus reducing the variation of people that could be affected by treatment variations.
Observations
Since we are comparing the protocols between-subject, we implement the experiment in the interest of budget and reasonable statistical power to have at least n=200 active subjects per treatment. A total of 600 participants is about as much as we can afford given our budget situation. Recruiting fewer subjects is not desirable as previous experimental from dictator games (under either protocol) consistently shows that a proportion of subjects (up to 50% in total) always and independent of treatment give either nothing or half, thus reducing the variation of people that could be affected by treatment variations.
Arms
Since we are comparing the protocols between-subject, we implement the experiment in the interest of budget and reasonable statistical power to have at least n=200 active subjects per treatment. A total of 600 participants is about as much as we can afford given our budget situation. Recruiting fewer subjects is not desirable as previous experimental from dictator games (under either protocol) consistently shows that a proportion of subjects (up to 50% in total) always and independent of treatment give either nothing or half, thus reducing the variation of people that could be affected by treatment variations.
Primary outcomes
The above mentioned 20 dictator games will be played under the two treatments/protocols described above. In each treatment, one randomly selected game will be chosen for payment. In each treatment, each dictator plays 20 dictator games. The games vary with respect to p, the price of redistribution of the amount given: given any p, the recipient receives p-times what was given. We chose all prices of redistribution from 0.1 to 2.0, and dictators will face them in random order.

Materials

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Keywords