Public goods games under a nonlinear tax system with an interior dominant strategy equilibrium
How to cite
Julius, Patrick. 2018. "Public goods games under a nonlinear tax system with an interior dominant strategy equilibrium." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003037. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3037-2.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
In the standard Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Hichri 2004), a linear public goods game, the dominant strategy equilibrium is to donate zero; therefore, any error or noise will appear to be altruism. I avoid this ``corner critique'' (Laury and Holt 2008) by using a nonlinear tax system to get an interior Nash equilibrium. It is also possible to do this by means of a threshold for the good to be provided; however, this induces a multiplicity of equilibria. My method induces a unique, sharp dominant strategy equilibrium, in which a player's best response does not depend on any other players' choices. Furthermore, by using a differentiable payoff function, I can measure the marginal cost of deviation from the dominant strategy equilibrium, inferring a willingness-to-pay for other-regarding behavior. Using software that provides real-time feedback about payoffs, I will test whether participants contribute more than the dominant strategy equilibrium, under treatments that vary the payoffs and the inequality of endowments such that both the equilibrium and the Pareto optimum are different across each treatment condition.
Intervention
Participants will be randomly assigned to groups, given endowments, and offered the chance to make contributions to their groups. Contributing to the group will benefit all members of the group, but at a cost to the individual making the contribution. Whatever remains of the endowment not contributed will then be "taxed" according to a rule that generates an interior dominant strategy equilibrium.
Interventions will vary the costs and benefits of "tax" versus contributions, as well as the endowments of the participants. Each treatment has a different level of contributions for each the dominant strategy equilibrium and the Pareto-optimal outcome.
Experimental design
Participants from an undergraduate pool will complete a series of tasks using custom computer software which provides detailed real-time feedback on the payoffs of their choices. They will go through a series of rounds; in each round, they will be randomly assigned to a group, given an endowment and asked to choose how much of that endowment to contribute to their group (a public goods game). Contributions to the group will be shared across participants with a marginal per-capita return between 0 and 1; endowments not contributed will then be "taxed" according to a rule explained to the participants. In some treatments tax revenue will have a marginal per-capita return higher than contribution; in others, lower. All treatments will be conducted using a within-participant design with randomized ordering. The dominant strategy equilibrium and the Pareto-optimal outcome will vary across treatments. A charity dictator task at the end will provide an independent measure of other-regarding preferences.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.