Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts

How to cite

Gulesci, Selim; Sulaiman, Munshi; Lerva, Benedetta; Burchardi, Konrad. 2018. "Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0003016. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3016-1.0

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Selim Gulesci* , Munshi Sulaiman , Benedetta Lerva , Konrad Burchardi

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0003016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3016-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2013-07-01 – 2015-03-31
Countries
Uganda ()
JEL codes
O12, Q12, Q15
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3016

Abstract

Agricultural productivity is particularly low in developing countries. Output sharing rules that make farmers less-than-full residual claimants of their produce are seen as one of the main drivers of low agricultural productivity. We conduct a field experiment designed to estimate and understand the effects of sharecropping contracts on agricultural input choices, risk-taking, and output. The experiment induces variation in the terms of sharecropping contracts. After agreeing to pay 50% of their output to the landlord, tenants are randomized into three groups: (i) some keep 50% of their output; (ii) others keep 75%; (iii) others keep 50% of output and receive a lump sum payment at the end of their contract, either fixed or stochastic. These treatments are designed to be able to estimate the effects of a higher share, a higher income, and higher risk-exposure on the end points of interest.

Experimental design

We collaborate with the NGO BRAC in Uganda to induce variation in tenancy contracts. BRAC leases plots of land to women from low socio-economic backgrounds who are interested in becoming farmers and provides them with agricultural training and a package of seeds for cultivation. In all villages, tenant farmers are contracted for one season under a sharecropping contract that gives them a 50% stake in the output. After signing the contract, villages are randomized into three groups. In the first group (Control), the contract is maintained -- i.e. tenants keep 50% of their output. In the second group (T1), tenants are offered to keep 75% of the output. Tenants in a third group (T2) keep the same output share as in control (50%) but receive an additional fixed payment which is independent of their output level, paid at harvest and announced at the same time as T1 received news of the higher share. Within this third group, half of the tenants (T2A) receive it as a risk-free cash transfer while the other half receive part of their additional payment as a lottery (T2B), the expected payment in T2A and T2B being the same. The plots are visited pre-harvest to measure output levels and crop choice; and all tenants are surveyed shortly after the harvest to record their input use, such as labor, fertilizer, and tools.

The experiment is implemented across two agricultural seasons of 2014, spanning from March to July (Season 1) and September 2014 to January 2015 (Season 2). In both of these seasons the plots are advertised under a 50% sharecropping contract, and the tenants sign that contract during the first training session. The contract is valid for 1 season only. Tenants sign that contract at the start of the agricultural season.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization is conducted at the village level. We group the 300 villages originally designated as potential study sites into clusters of three villages (henceforth referred to as `blocks'), with the heuristic objective to minimize within-block geographic distance. The study groups are typically geographically bunched. We also group villages into these large clusters (henceforth referred to as `strata'). Assignment to treatment is randomized at the village level. We assign equal fractions of the 300 potential study villages to each treatment condition, stratified by blocks. Within T2 clubs we assign 50 clubs to T2A and T2B, respectively, stratified by strata. The randomization is done by researchers in an office, using a computer.
Randomization unit
Unit of randomization was a village.
Clusters
300 villages
Observations
300 tenant farmers
Arms
100 villages in Control, 100 villages in T1, 50 villages in T2A and 50 villages in T2B.
Primary outcomes
Agricultural output from the experimental plots, inputs used on the plots (e.g. labor, fertilizer, insecticide, tools), crop choice.
Secondary outcomes
Farmers' socio-economic status (income, consumption, savings, assets); soil quality of the experimental plots.

Papers from this trial

  1. Burchardi, K., S. Gulesci, B. Lerva and M. Sulaiman (2017), "Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence from Tenancy Contracts" CEPR Working Paper DP12232 https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12232

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Keywords