Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games
How to cite
Gawn, Glynis; Innes, Robert. 2018. "Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002999. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2999-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We conduct a series of dictator experiments in which dictators can delegate their decision to another player. In the first experiment, two delegation treatments are considered, one in which the delegation option is equivalent to a choice of selfish payments (higher for the Dictator, lower for the Receiver) and another where delegation is equivalent to choice of generous/equal payments. Our interest in this experiment is in the extent to which delegation differs across treatments. A second issue that we investigate is who delegates - generous or selfish participants?
Experimental design
Participants choose an allocation for themselves and another participant, which can be selfish or generous, and which can be made directly or through delegation. Treatments vary in whether the delegation choice corresponds to a selfish or generous decision.
Design details
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