Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games

How to cite

Gawn, Glynis; Innes, Robert. 2018. "Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002999. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2999-1.0

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Glynis Gawn* , Robert Innes

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002999
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2999-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2017-04-03 – 2021-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D03
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2999

Abstract

We conduct a series of dictator experiments in which dictators can delegate their decision to another player. In the first experiment, two delegation treatments are considered, one in which the delegation option is equivalent to a choice of selfish payments (higher for the Dictator, lower for the Receiver) and another where delegation is equivalent to choice of generous/equal payments. Our interest in this experiment is in the extent to which delegation differs across treatments. A second issue that we investigate is who delegates - generous or selfish participants?

Experimental design

Participants choose an allocation for themselves and another participant, which can be selfish or generous, and which can be made directly or through delegation. Treatments vary in whether the delegation choice corresponds to a selfish or generous decision.

Design details

Randomization method
Distribution of experimental questionnaires in classrooms.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
100-500
Observations
100-500
Arms
40-150 per treatment
Primary outcomes
Whether a participant delegates or not
Secondary outcomes
Who is delegating - otherwise selfish or otherwise generous?

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords