Helping Behavior and Group Size

How to cite

Campos-Mercade, Pol. 2018. "Helping Behavior and Group Size." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002982. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2982-5.1

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Pol Campos-Mercade*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002982
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2982-5.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2018-06-18 – 2018-06-29
Countries
Germany (Hamburg)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2982

Abstract

Will a person in need of help be more likely to be helped when there are one or several potential helpers? Dozens of experiments have led social psychologists to conclude that the answer to this question depends entirely on the situation. This project uses game theory to predict in what situations one potential helper is more likely to provide help than a group of several potential helpers, and in what situations the opposite is true. The theoretical model concludes that in situations where few potential helpers are willing to help, then help is more likely to be provided when many people can help. However, in situations where most potential helpers are willing to help, help is more likely to be provided when only one person can help. I test this model in a lab experiment.

Intervention

To understand this part, read first the Experimental Design.

The main intervention is in the second stage of the experiment. Here, I exogenously manipulate the composition of the subjects' pool. Some subjects therefore end up in a pool in which most AP chose to Pay in Decision 1, and some subjects end up in a pool in which most AP chose to Not Pay in Decision 1 (this, of course, depends on how many subjects chose to Pay in Decision 1; if for example all of them chose to Pay, then the two pools will consist only of AP who chose to Pay in Decision 1). The PP, who only make hypothetical decisions (and are told so), are always placed in a pool in which most AP chose to Not Pay in Decision 1.

Main hypothesis: Subjects in groups of multiple AP are more likely to choose to Pay when they are in a group in which most people chose to Not Pay in Decision 1 than when they are in a group in which most people chose to Pay in Decision 1. This hypothesis is tested between-subject (second stage) and within-subject (third stage).

Second hypothesis: If most people in a group chose to Pay in Decision 1, then the PP is better off in a group of one than in a group of multiple AP. If most people in a group chose to Not Pay in Decision 1, then the PP is better off in a group of multiple than in a group of one AP. This hypothesis is tested within-subject (third stage).

Experimental design

There will be 378 subjects. Each session will consist of 18 subjects. Subjects are initially divided between Active Participants (AP) and Passive Participants (PP). The AP earnings depend on their decisions, while the PP earnings depend on the decisions of the AP. However, the PP do not know that they are PP until the end. They therefore make hypothetical decisions throughout the experiment.

The game: Subjects are placed in groups of one, two, or three AP and one PP. Within each group, the AP start with 10€ and the PP starts with 0€. The AP then play the following game: they can choose to Pay 3€ or to Not Pay. To Pay 3€ means to get 7€ instead of 10€. If at least one AP in the group chooses to Pay, the PP gets 5€. If none of the AP chooses to Pay, then the PP gets 0€.

The experiment has three stages. In the first stage, subjects play this game in groups of one, two, and three AP (in random order). The decision that subjects make when they are in the group of one AP is called "Decision 1".

In the second stage, subjects play the same game but this time they get information about what other AP in their group chose in Decision 1. More concretely, they are told that the other AP in their group have been randomly selected from a "pool" of 6 AP. They are then told how many of these 6 AP of the pool chose to Pay in Decision 1.

The third stage uses the strategy method to elicit subjects' decision whether to Pay depending on how many of the other AP in their pool chose to Pay in Decision 1.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by computer. Note that randomization is endogenous: those who chose to (Not) Pay in Decision 1 are more likely to be in a pool in which most people chose to (Not) Pay. However, given that someone chose to (Not) Pay in Decision 1, that subject is effectively randomly assigned into either of the pools.
Randomization unit
Individual randomization.
Clusters
378 subjects.
Observations
378 observations.
Arms
Out of the 378 observations, 252 will be AP and 126 will be PP. The AP will be equally divided between those who see a pool in which most AP chose to Pay in Decision 1 and those who see a pool in which most AP chose to Not Pay in Decision 1. All the 126 PP will see situations in which most AP in their pool chose to Not Pay. Therefore, I expect about 252 observations where AP are in a pool in which most AP chose to Not Pay in Decision 1 and 126 where AP are in a pool in which most AP chose to Pay in Decision 1.
Primary outcomes
Help_second_1, Help_second_2, Help_second_3, Help_second_23 (between-test), Nethelp_second_23 (between-test), Help_third (main within-test).
Secondary outcomes
Help_first_1, Help_first_2, Help_first_3, Beliefs

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Keywords