Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions
How to cite
Ziegler, Andreas; Romagnoli, Giorgia; Offerman, Theo. 2018. "Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002965. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2965-3.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment with common value auctions, we study the impact of endogenously revealed information. The outcomes of interest are the revenue properties of different auction formats and the response of participants to information, e.g. by adjusting bidding strategies. In three treatments, we compare a second-price auction with an English auction with irrevocable exit (Japanese English auction) and an oral outcry auction.
Experimental design
Three treatments, comparing a second-price auction, an English auction with irrevocable exit (Japanese English auction) and an oral outcry auction.
Design details
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