Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions

How to cite

Ziegler, Andreas; Romagnoli, Giorgia; Offerman, Theo. 2018. "Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002965. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2965-3.0

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Andreas Ziegler* , Giorgia Romagnoli , Theo Offerman

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002965
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2965-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2018-06-28 – 2019-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2965

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment with common value auctions, we study the impact of endogenously revealed information. The outcomes of interest are the revenue properties of different auction formats and the response of participants to information, e.g. by adjusting bidding strategies. In three treatments, we compare a second-price auction with an English auction with irrevocable exit (Japanese English auction) and an oral outcry auction.

Experimental design

Three treatments, comparing a second-price auction, an English auction with irrevocable exit (Japanese English auction) and an oral outcry auction.

Design details

Randomization method
- Normally distributed values and signals drawn before sessions by a computer - Random assignment of participants into (matching) groups done by a computer during the experimental sessions.
Randomization unit
Treatment assignment and values/signals are randomized across sessions. Within a session, participants are rematched into groups of 5 every period, within matching groups of 10 participants.
Clusters
We will run 1 or 2 matching groups (clusters) per session and we aim for 10 matching groups of 10 subjects each per treatment.
Observations
300 participants in total.
Arms
10 matching groups with 10 participants per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Revenues, bids

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords