First-Price Auctions: Single- vs. Multi-Stage Mechanisms
How to cite
Riehm, Tobias; Gillen, Philippe; Fugger, Nicolas. 2018. "First-Price Auctions: Single- vs. Multi-Stage Mechanisms." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002937. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2937-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We experimentally test our hypothesis, that participants bid more aggressively in multi-stage first-price auctions than in single-stage first-price auctions. This hypothesis is based on the assumption bidders are loss-averse narrow-bracketers and is driven by an increasing attachment effect. Standard theory predicts revenue equivalence.
The multi-stage format consists of a semi-final and a final. In the semi-final the set of bidders is reduced to two based on highest bids, and in the final the good is allocated to the bidder with the highest final bid.
Experimental design
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Design details
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