First-Price Auctions: Single- vs. Multi-Stage Mechanisms

How to cite

Riehm, Tobias; Gillen, Philippe; Fugger, Nicolas. 2018. "First-Price Auctions: Single- vs. Multi-Stage Mechanisms." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002937. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2937-1.0

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Tobias Riehm* , Philippe Gillen , Nicolas Fugger

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002937
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2937-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2018-05-03 – 2018-09-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D44, D47
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2937

Abstract

We experimentally test our hypothesis, that participants bid more aggressively in multi-stage first-price auctions than in single-stage first-price auctions. This hypothesis is based on the assumption bidders are loss-averse narrow-bracketers and is driven by an increasing attachment effect. Standard theory predicts revenue equivalence.
The multi-stage format consists of a semi-final and a final. In the semi-final the set of bidders is reduced to two based on highest bids, and in the final the good is allocated to the bidder with the highest final bid.

Experimental design

See in hidden section

Design details

Randomization method
Groups and amount of winning numbers are randomized by a computer; Relevant round and lottery outcome are randomized by a 10-sided dice
Randomization unit
Experimental session
Clusters
12-20 cohorts
Observations
48 - 80 subjects per treatment, 96 - 160 subjects total
Arms
6-10 cohorts per treatment
Primary outcomes
Auction Revenue Bidding Behavior

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords