Information Asymmetries in Crop Insurance: Evidence from the Philippines

How to cite

Gunnsteinsson, Snaebjorn. 2018. "Information Asymmetries in Crop Insurance: Evidence from the Philippines." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002930. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2930-1.0

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Snaebjorn Gunnsteinsson*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002930
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2930-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2010-03-01 – 2012-07-31
Countries
Philippines ()
JEL codes
O1, D82, G22, C9
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2930

Abstract

Trial:
Asymmetric information imposes costs on a wide range of markets and may explain why some important markets, such as most agricultural insurance markets, have failed to develop. This trial uses a two-level randomization and incentivized preference elicitation to study asymmetric information in crop insurance in the Philippines. A total of 569 farmers participated in the experiments, which were conducted in 2010-12. Farmers were asked which plot in their portfolio they preferred to be insured and insurance was randomly allocated to farmers and plots in a way that provided for incentive compatibility in the plot choice decision and induced within- and across-farm variability in insurance coverage. The data generated by the choice and randomized experiments were combined with detailed farm- and plot-level survey data, geospatial data on plot and residence location and administrative data from the insurance provider.

Results:
In this first RCT of moral hazard in non-health insurance I find evidence of moral hazard in preventing damage from pests and crop diseases and this effect is particularly strong among farmers who report high trust in the insurance company: for this group harvest losses from this cause double on insured plots. Farmers prefer insurance on plots that are at risk of floods and crop diseases, a sign of classic adverse selection, and plots that are far away from home, a sign of selection on anticipated moral hazard behavior, resulting in 72% higher payouts on preferred plots.

Intervention

Crop insurance from the Philippines Crop Insurance Corporation.

Experimental design

The randomization was done in two levels. First, farmers were randomized into treatment groups. Second, plots of farmers in the treatment groups were randomized to be covered by insurance or not. Before randomization farmers were asked to rank their plots in order of preference for insurance and the randomization was done in a way to provide incentive compatibility in the farmers' first choice.

Design details

Randomization method
By computer.
Randomization unit
Level 1: Farmer/farm; Level 2: Plot
Clusters
Total of 569 farmers were ever registered in the trial. Some farmers participated in multiple rounds of the experiment and we had a total of 838 farmer-season observations in the full scale experiments (excluding the pilot).
Observations
We had a total of 2,399 plots in the full scale experiments.
Arms
About 2/3 of farmers were in treatment.
Primary outcomes
Harvest losses due to (1) typhoons or floods, or (2) pests and crop diseases. Insurance payouts.
Secondary outcomes
Harvest, fertilizer use.

Cited by

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Keywords