Guilt Aversion in Multi-Agent Settings
How to cite
Lenz, Lisa. 2018. "Guilt Aversion in Multi-Agent Settings." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002901. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2901-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This research project addresses experimentally as well as theoretically whether decision makers state more selfish decisions if they are protected by the anonymity of the mass and the consequences of their decisions affect a collective of economic agents compared to a situation where they interact with solely one agent?
This presumed increase in selfish behavior is backed up by predictions derived from an adapted versions of the simple guilt and the guilt from blame model by Batigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). In other words, differences in how decision makers experience feelings of guilt and shame for not living up to the expectations of others may differ in multi-agent settings. The concept of guilt offers four different behavioral channels for a potential increase in selfish behavior.
A dictator game experiment is ran on mturk to approach the main research question as well as to disentangle the different potential behavioral channels. In order to address the main hypothesis, the number of dictators & recipient within one group is varied. In order to discriminate between different behavioral channel, the strategy method (dictators state their decisions contingent on different expectations of recipients) is applied, the post-experimental feedback is varied and first order beliefs about the behavior of other dictators are elicited.
Intervention
I randomly assign participants to the different treatment conditions.
The exogenous varied variables are the group size of the dictator setting as well as the post experimental feedback concerning the dictators' decisions. Furthermore, I let dictators state their decisions contingent on different potential beliefs of recipients by applying the strategy method.
Experimental design
Baseline Condition:
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Participants will be assigned either type A (dictator) or type B (recipient).
Every type A is randomly matched with a B-participant. Every participant A can decide how much he/she wants to take of the pot that contains $1.00. Participant typ B earns whatever is left in the pot.
Treatment Condition 1 :
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8 participants will be assigned either type A or type B. The 4 A-participants and the 4 B-participants interact.
There is a common pot that contains $4.00.Every A-participant can decide how much he/she wants to take out of the common pot up to an amount of $1.00 per participant.The amount of money that remains in the pot after every of the 4 type A participants made the decision will be split equally among the participants of type B.
Participants of type B cannot act.
Treatment Condition 2 :
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8 participants will be assigned either type A or type B. The 20 A-participants and the 20 B-participants interact.
There is a common pot that contains $20.00.Every A-participant can decide how much he/she wants to take out of the common pot up to an amount of $1.00 per participant.The amount of money that remains in the pot after every of the 20 type A participants made the decision will be split equally among the participants of type B.
Participants of type B cannot act.
Further Variations:
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In Treatment Condition (1) and (2) I further vary the post-experimental feedback. In one condition, B-particpants receive information about how much an average A-participants get or receive information about the distribution of A-players' decisions.
Design details
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