Repayment Flexibility in Microcredit Contracts: Evidence from Bangladesh

How to cite

Gulesci, Selim; Battaglia, Marianna; Madestam, Andreas. 2018. "Repayment Flexibility in Microcredit Contracts: Evidence from Bangladesh." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002892. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2892-1.0

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Selim Gulesci* , Marianna Battaglia , Andreas Madestam

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002892
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2892-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-01-20 – 2017-08-15
Countries
Bangladesh ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2892

Abstract

We study how the introduction of a new microcredit loan with greater repayment flexibility affects firm growth among existing borrowers, and how it changes the pool of borrowers who select into borrowing. BRAC, one of the largest microfinance institutions in the world, decided to pilot a new loan product with greater repayment flexibility in Bangladesh. The new, flexible loan contract allows borrowers with good credit history to delay 2 repayments (out of 12 monthly repayments) within their loan cycle. Using a cluster-randomized design, we evaluate the effect of the flexible loan contract on eligible borrowers’ investment and borrowing decisions and firm growth. Moreover, we track the borrowing decisions of a representative sample of microenterprises in treatment and control areas to study which types of firms become microfinance clients after the introduction of the new loan.

Intervention

The most common microfinance contract offered by BRAC entails a 12-month loan repayment cycle with monthly instalments of equal size. The flexible loan contract allows instead eligible borrowers to delay up to two repayments within their loan cycle through the use of repayment vouchers. Eligible borrowers who qualify for the flexible loan contract are offered 2 vouchers that enable them to postpone 2 monthly repayments in their loan cycle. Specifically, by extending the cycle to 14 instead of 12 months the borrowers have 2 months during which they will not be required to make any repayments to BRAC. For example, if borrowers skip the first two instalments, the repayments start in month 3 and can continue up to month 14 (corresponding to a simple grace period contract) or be paid within the 12 months (corresponding to a back-loaded repayment schedule). If clients decide to use their vouchers to avoid any other instalment(s), the repayment in that month will be skipped and the full loan cycle can be extended by an additional month. Hence, the contract to be piloted not only encompasses the grace period contract but it also provides for greater flexibility as the borrowers can tailor-make their loan cycle to their needs (they will still be limited to delaying up to 2 repayments).

Experimental design

To evaluate the effects of the new loan contract, we randomized the piloting of the flexible loan contract at the BRAC branch office level. BRAC selected fifty branches for the study and credit officers in each branch identified borrowers that they deemed eligible for the flexible loan contract. After this, we randomly selected 25 branches as treatment and 25 as control. The randomization was stratified by geographical region. Prior to randomization, BRAC provided us with a list of the eligible clients in each branch. From this list, we randomly sampled 2,717 eligible borrowers. Of this sample, 1,115 were mainstream microfinance clients (called “Dabi” loan) and 1,602 were microenterprise clients (called “Progoti” loan). The latter are on average larger loans, requires collateral and could be taken by male or female borrowers; while the mainstream microfinance loans are only given to female borrowers and require no collateral.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization was conducted by the research team on a computer.
Randomization unit
The randomization was conducted at the BRAC branch office level.
Clusters
50 BRAC branch offices.
Observations
We have 2,717 eligible borrowers (1,115 mainstream microfinance (“Dabi”) clients and 1,602 microenterprise “Progoti” clients); and 3,504 firms in the SME sample.
Arms
25 BRAC branch offices in treatment and 25 BRAC branch offices in control.
Primary outcomes
For eligible borrowers (i.e. existing BRAC clients selected as eligible to receive the flexible loan by BRAC credit officers), the key outcomes of interest are: borrowing decisions (amount borrowed, likelihood to remain as BRAC clients, borrowing from other lenders or informal sources); lending or transfers to others; firm outcomes (amount of capital and labor inputs, revenues, costs, profits, number of businesses); household outcomes (income, consumption, household assets, land ownership); repayment behavior (late repayment, default). For the representative sample of microenterprises (SME sample): likelihood to become BRAC clients, amount borrowed from BRAC.

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Keywords