Reducing Absenteeism in the Workplace

How to cite

Alfitian, Jakob; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo. 2018. "Reducing Absenteeism in the Workplace." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002863. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2863-1.1

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Jakob Alfitian* , Dirk Sliwka , Timo Vogelsang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002863
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2863-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2017-08-01 – 2019-03-31
Countries
Germany ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2863

Abstract

Excessive absenteeism in the workplace may affect workers’ productivity, firm’s financial output as well as team cohesion and perceived fairness. Yet, causal evidence on the effectiveness of potential instruments to reduce employee absence is scarce. We conduct a field experiment (RCT) in collaboration with a large German retail chain to investigate the effectiveness of two incentive schemes, randomly assigned among the firm’s apprentices. In particular, apprentices collect points throughout the year earning one point for each month without a single day of absence. At the end of the year, points are converted into a reward according to the randomly assigned treatment condition. One group of apprentices receives a monetary reward; another group receives a reward in the form of additional vacation days. The remaining apprentices serve as the control group. Treatments are designed to reduce those absence spells that are not due to genuine sickness, but are a form of shirking behaviour. The novelty of the time-off reward lies in the fact that it is in the same domain as the primary outcome. Therefore, it is less likely to backfire into excessive presenteeism. Along with a rich set of employee characteristics, we are able to observe the apprentices' daily attendance prior to, during and after the invention. We complement this dataset with two comprehensive surveys to investigate changes in the apprentices’ perception and to identify the corresponding mechanisms.

Intervention

We collaborate with a retail chain. Management in one region considered to implement a monetary attendance incentive, following the example of a comparable incentive scheme already in use in a different region. We offered to evaluate this instrument and proposed a variation that is not only novel to the academic literature, but may also reduce possible adverse effects associated with monetary incentives. The intervention takes place in a region. With the exception of final year apprentices, all of the firm's apprentices in the respective region participate in the experiment. The firm distinguishes between two different store types. For administrative reasons expressed by the firm, stores of type II are not eligible for one of the treatment conditions (treatment Time).

Experimental design

There are three different treatment conditions, henceforth referred to as Time, Money and the control group. All apprentices receive a personal letter sent to their home address from the firm’s HR office. For apprentices in the control group, essentially nothing changes during the treatment. They are only made aware of a project called “Attendance Bonus” and that this project will be relevant to them at some later stage. Apprentices in the remaining two treatment groups are notified that they receive a “bonus point” for each month without a single day of absence due to sickness. The total duration of the experiment is twelve months. After every three months in the treatment period, the incentivized apprentices receive feedback on their current point score. However, bonus points are only transformed into actual rewards after the end of the experiment. Importantly, only the total number of accumulated points is payoff-relevant. The reward function is identical for both the Money and the Time condition. However, the two treatments differ with respect to the nature of the employed reward domain.

Time
In the Time treatment, one reward unit corresponds to an extra holiday. A maximum number of four extra holidays can be achieved. The respective apprentices are granted their extra holidays two months after the end of the treatment period. From then on, the apprentice is free to choose when to make use of the additional holidays. Only store type I apprentices are eligible for the Time treatment for administrative reasons.

Money
In the Money treatment, one reward unit corresponds to a bonus payment of €60. That is, a maximum bonus payment of €240 can be achieved. This conversion rate is chosen such that the values of a single reward unit are approximately equivalent for both reward domains. The respective apprentices receive their bonus payments in addition to their regular salary two months after the end of the treatment period.

Control
Apprentices in the control group are not incentivized. Yet, they receive a notification prior to the beginning of the treatment period vaguely indicating that randomly chosen groups of apprentices will receive some sort of attendance contingent reward. Furthermore, they are notified that they will receive a comparable reward at a later point in time. In the context of the retail chain, informing the control group is inevitable, since apprentices in different treatment groups may yet attend the same vocational training school and thus exchange information. Therefore, informing those apprentices who are not incentivized that they are not systematically disadvantaged may prevent them from alternating their (attendance) behavior as an act of defiance.

Design details

Randomization method
Stratified Randomization
Randomization unit
Store Treatments were assigned seperately for type I and type II stores, albeit following the same procedure.
Clusters
315 Stores: 151 Type I Stores 164 Type II Stores
Observations
542 Apprentices: 268 Type I Store Apprentices 274 Type II Store Apprentices
Arms
Time: 90 Money: 234 Control: 218
Primary outcomes
Mean number of days absent due to sickness
Secondary outcomes
Mean number of single day absences due to sickness Mean length of absence spells

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Jakob Alfitian, Dirk Sliwka, Timo Vogelsang (2023) When Bonuses Backfire: Evidence from the Workplace. Management Science 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00484

Cited by

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Keywords