Information Nudges, Subsidies, and Crowding Out of Attention: Field Evidence from Energy Efficiency Investments

How to cite

Rodemeier, Matthias; Löschel, Andreas. 2018. "Information Nudges, Subsidies, and Crowding Out of Attention: Field Evidence from Energy Efficiency Investments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002814. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2814-7.0

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Matthias Rodemeier* , Andreas Löschel

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002814
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2814-7.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2018-03-29 – 2019-08-31
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
D61, D83, H21, Q41, Q48
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2814

Abstract

How can information substitute or complement financial incentives such as Pigouvian subsidies? We answer this question in a large-scale field experiment that cross-randomizes energy efficiency subsidies with information about the financial savings of LED lighting. Information has two effects: It shifts and rotates demand curves. The direction of the shift is ambiguous and highly dependent on the information design. Informing consumers that an LED saves 90% in annual energy costs increases LED demand, but showing them that 90% corresponds to an average of 11 euros raises demand for less efficient technologies. The rotation of the demand curve is unambiguous: information dramatically reduces both own-price and cross-price elasticities, which makes subsidies less effective. The uniform decrease in price elasticities suggests that consumers pay less attention to subsidies when information is provided. We structurally estimate that welfare-maximizing subsidies can be 200% larger than the Pigouvian benchmark when combined with information.

Experimental design

Visitors of an online shop are randomly assigned to different groups in a 3x5 between-subject design.

We vary both the prices of different lighting technologies and the information provided on energy efficiency. This experimental design facilitates the estimation of price elasticities for different lighting technologies under different sets of information provision.

After customers went through the purchasing decision they receive an invitation to participate in a survey. The survey elicits variables such as energy and financial literacy, income, patience, environmental attitudes and other consumer-specific characteristics.

Design details

Randomization method
This experiment is between-subject. The retailer will use a professional A/B-testing tool from a third-party provider to randomly assign each visitor into one of 15 experimental groups with equal probability.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit is the HTTP-Cookie of the visitor.
Clusters
The treatments are not clustered.
Observations
600,000 website visitors
Arms
40,000 website visitors per treatment.
Primary outcomes
The number of LED, CFL, halogen and incandescent light bulbs purchased. The price elasticity for all four light bulb technologies (incandescent, halogen, CFL, LED). We also estimate whether our interventions affected the extensive margin, i.e. the probability of purchasing a light bulb.

Papers from this trial

  1. Rodemeier, Matthias, and Andreas L¨oschel. 2020. “The Welfare Effects of Persuasion and Taxation: Theory and Evidence from the Field.” CESifo Working Paper No. 8259. https://drive.google.com/file/d/13v98GOpVp_vC6OzPWSqJtFcFPuAYmo-a/view

Cited by

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Keywords