In a controlled laboratory experiment, we investigate in a standard voting game whether politicians choose ambiguous platforms and whether voters vote for these platforms. In particular, we focus on how the correlation structure in the population affects behavior of politicians and voters and how competition between politicians affects platform choices.
Intervention
The main experimental treatments vary exogenously the strategic incentives for candidates to choose ambiguous policies and voters to support ambiguous platforms.
Experimental design
Between-subject design.
Design details
Randomization method
At the start of each session, participants are randomly assigned to a treatment.
Randomization unit
The randomization unit is an experimental session.
Clusters
2 (between-subject treatments) x 8 (sessions). There will be 15 voters and 10 candidates in each session, each of whom makes 20 decisions. Decisions are clustered at the session level.
Observations
Sample size for voters is 4800 (15 voter * 20 periods * 16 sessions). Sample size for candidates is 3200 (10 candidates * 20 periods * 16 sessions).
Arms
In each of the two treatment arms there is an equal number of observations for voters (2400) and for candidates (1600).
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome variables of interest are individual-level behavior of candidates and voters in the voting game, i.e. choice of an ambiguous platform (for candidates) and voting for a proposed ambiguous platform (for voters).