Image Concerns In Social Decisions
How to cite
Ay, Fehime Ceren. 2018. "Image Concerns In Social Decisions." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002798. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2798-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
By making decisions individuals reveal a part of their characters and dispositions to others and to
self. Finding an answer to why people refrain themselves from the actions which yield more utility
for them and engage in other-benefiting ones by bearing the cost (even pecuniary) is one of the topics
takes place in psychology and economics literature. Both fields provided explanations by using extrinsic
& intrinsic motivations, such as difference and inequality aversion, guilt aversion, the taste of
fairness and image concerns. People vote, engage in voluntary activities, make donations, and in the
experiments usually, give and share with others even when they don’t have to. Evidence from experiments
shows that when there are situational excuses, altruistic behavior decreases substantially.These
findings support the idea that the main driver of the altruistic decisions may not be a desire for fair/
altruistic outcomes but a desire not to appear bad either to oneself or to others. In other words, the
diagnostic utility of being seen as a good/fair person by self and by others might be the main motivation
behind other-regarding preferences. While experimental evidence confirms the importance
and effects of image concerns, to the best of my knowledge there is not enough evidence to see the
robustness of social decisions under these image concerns particularly in reciprocal decisions which
are richer in the moral context.The present experiment aims to capture whether if the estimated effects of image concerns can
be generalized to all social decisions by using a manipulated trust(investment) game.
Experimental design
The present experiment aims to capture whether if the estimated effects of image concerns can
be generalized to all social decisions by using a manipulated trust(investment) game. The effects of
the moral excuses will be observed through the actions of second movers who are randomly assigned
to roles and endowments and given the chance to hide information about the consequences of their
action.
Design details
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