Price Discovery in Online Markets: Convergence, Asymmetries and Information

How to cite

Nax, Heinrich; Duran, Diego Nunez; Pradelski, Bary. 2018. "Price Discovery in Online Markets: Convergence, Asymmetries and Information." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0002775. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2775-1.0

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Heinrich Nax* , Diego Nunez Duran , Bary Pradelski

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0002775
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2775-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-10-13 – 2016-11-17
Countries
Switzerland (Zurich)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2775

Abstract

Prices tend to converge rapidly to competitive prices in traditional markets for non-durable goods. An open question has been whether and why the same applies in online markets in light of the increase in size, anonymity and information decentrality that characterizes them. We conduct
controlled experiments.

We test the following main hypotheses:

[H1.] Direction of successful/unsuccessful bids and offers are reinforced/reverted.
[H2.] There are asymmetries in terms of adjustment size depending on whether a bid was successful/unsuccessful.
[H3.] The adjustment size depends (positively) on the level of the bid.
[H4.] Information affects the bid/offer behavior. (How does it affect findings regarding H1-H3?)

Intervention

The key dependent variable is the bid/ask that a market participants makes. It will be measures in absolute terms and relative to the agent's willingness to pay/buy, which is a variable randomly allocated by us as the experimenter.

We run two-sided (buyer,seller) trading markets where subjects can buy/sell identical goods (one per trading period). We vary the information content subjects receive about bids, asks, realized prices.

Experimental design

Our experiments are conducted on \emph{Scienceexperiment Online} `SciOn' at \texttt{scienceexperiment.online} (please see \texttt{scienceexperiment.online/demo} for a demo). SciOn is our own new real-time trading platform designed to handle multiple large real-time trading experiments in parallel. We developed it from scratch during 2016 using the programming language PHP. Simultaneous real-time play requires instantaneous synchronization, which we ensure via a WebSocket computer communication protocol (instead of the standard HTTP protocol).
This protocol allows interaction between a web client and a web server with lower overheads, thus facilitating real-time message exchanging. Importantly it allows to quasi-constantly `refresh' a users page, thus providing every user with real-time information about other users' bids, offers, and realized prices. In addition, the efficiency of the WebSocket protocol allows running multiple, separate trading rooms at the same time, each of which may be large (we tested our platform successfully for over 10 trading rooms with at least 20 participants each, and for trading rooms of up to 400 participants).
To possess live control of the current status of the whole system (message dispatching and queuing, transaction count, database, query, etc.) we developed a server monitor, which also contains an emergency module that enables communication with the participants in case of failure in the main server.

Design details

Randomization method
Subject recruitment is via Amazon Mechanical Turk. A subject is randomly assigned a position in the trading game by our software.
Randomization unit
Individuals are randomly assigned trading positions.
Clusters
we are planning to recruit ca. 400 subjects into 20 clusters. That is each market will roughly consist of 20 agents, 10 buyers and 10 sellers.
Observations
We expect to observe bids and offers in the range of 100,000. We expect to observe more than 1000 realized prizes.
Arms
20 trading experiments witch ca. 20 traders each
Primary outcomes
The outputs are: * explain individual bid adjustments * explain which information is relevant * explain asymmetries between buyers and sellers
Secondary outcomes
N/A

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords